The Dynamics of Global States in Executive Control by Hubbard, Jason
 
 
 
 
 
THE DYNAMICS OF GLOBAL STATES IN EXECUTIVE CONTROL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
JASON HUBBARD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A DISSERTATION 
 
Presented to the Department of Psychology 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
June 2017 
 ii 
 
DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE 
 
Student: Jason Hubbard 
 
Title: The Dynamics of Global States in Executive Control 
 
This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Psychology by: 
 
Ulrich Mayr Chairperson 
David Unsworth Core Member 
Elliot Berkman Core Member 
Santiago Jaramillo Institutional Representative 
 
and 
 
Scott L. Pratt Dean of the Graduate School  
 
Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. 
 
Degree awarded June 2017 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2017 Jason Hubbard  
 iv 
 
DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Jason Hubbard 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Psychology  
 
June 2017 
 
Title: The Dynamics of Global States in Executive Control 
 
 
In the present work, we examine how the cognitive system responds to complex 
environments. It has been proposed that executive control, which is responsible for 
orchestrating high-level behavior in such environments, operates according to different 
broad processing modes, one geared towards stability and focus (“maintenance”), and the 
other that’s open to environmental influence (“updating”). Aging work has proposed that 
this latter mode is over-represented in older age, leading to deficits in many, but not all 
cognitive domains. Across three studies, we sought to identify the dynamics of the 
updating state in particular, and how those dynamics are shifted in older age. In Chapter 
II, we used a paradigm designed specifically to enforce maintenance and updating states 
with an age-comparative sample, and found that older adults show increased behavioral 
costs (reaction times) and distractibility (distractor fixations) consistent with being 
“chronic updaters”. In Chapter III we probed the updating state by examining 
spontaneous fixations towards irrelevant cues, allowing us to identify how it occurs both 
in response to the task context, and independently from it. We found that older adults 
were more sensitive to global changes in the task context (single versus mixed-task 
blocks), but also showed a stronger tendency to update independently from the task. 
Younger adults, by contrast, were more prone to update in response to transient task 
 v 
 
events. In Chapter IV, we lay the groundwork to address these questions with 
neuroimaging, using machine learning to extract information regarding the task context 
(task set, targets, distractors, response-selection) in a task-switching paradigm on a trial-
by-trial and moment-by-moment level. This opens the door for more directly measuring 
neural signatures of updating and gives a more high-fidelity measure to examine the 
dynamics of how and when it occurs. Together, this work provides some insight into the 
dynamics and age-differences involved in global processing states, which heretofore have 
been under-investigated in the literature. Additionally, we provide important analytic and 
methodological advancements for extending this work in the future.   
 This dissertation includes previously unpublished co-authored material. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
A central challenge of the cognitive system is to guide behavior in a coherent 
fashion across varied and unpredictable environments. We know from previous cognitive 
and neuroscience work that the brain is modular in nature, having roughly 
compartmentalized processes responsible for handling different types of information 
(Gazzaniga, Ivry, & Mangun, 2002), and thus the challenge is to tie together these 
disparate systems to produce fluent and adaptive behavior. While there is considerable 
variability in its exact definition (Banich, 2009), the construct of executive control (also 
called cognitive control) is considered the process responsible for such orchestration. The 
challenge faced by executive control as a cognitive process, and by the researchers who 
study it, is that it should operate in various contexts and influence behavior across many 
lower-level systems. If we consider executive control as that which produces “optimal” 
behavior in a given environment, there is still the difficulty in defining universally-
optimal behavior. In short, such behavior does not exist, as there are always cases where 
behavior that is adaptive in one context can be harmful in another. One prominent 
example is the ability to maintain focus in the face of distracting information in the 
environment. This is certainly adaptive for situations commonly encountered in school or 
the workplace, as well as many cognitive tasks (e.g., Stroop, Flanker; Stroop, 1935; 
Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). However, this focus would actually be harmful in other 
situations, for instance while navigating a crowded space in an unfamiliar environment, 
or avoiding an unexpected obstacle when driving a vehicle. This ability to balance more 
stable or focused, versus more flexible behavior in light of changing contexts is 
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something that has been studied extensively (c.f., Driesbach & Goschke, 2004; Aston-
Jones & Cohen, 2005; Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008). It also underscores a potential 
solution for a cognitive system that must orchestrate complex and adaptive behavior in 
changing contexts—rather than coordinating all lower-level processing in a way that is 
tailored to each unique context, perhaps the system can simply switch between more 
global processing “modes” that influence how information is processed in the lower-level 
systems. This is a way that executive control may influence behavior in a way that’s 
adaptive for changing environments, while reducing the complexity involved in exerting 
that influence.  
 This idea of switching between broadly stable or broadly flexible modes carries 
some weight in the neuroscience literature, where it has been formulated in 
computational models (O’Reilly, 2006; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Durstewitz & 
Seamans, 2008). In one case, O’Reilly (2006) proposes a model of working memory 
(WM), where dopamine-based interactions between the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and the 
basal ganglia either keep WM in a protected, “maintenance” state where its contents are 
resistant to change, or an “updating” state, where it is opened up to information from the 
environment, allowing the WM contents to be updated.  Aston-Jones and Cohen (2005) 
propose a model based on the noradrenaline system, which has long-range projections 
across the cortex and thus can exert broad influence. In their model, the brain alternates 
between a stable, “exploitation” mode where current representations are robustly 
maintained, and a flexible “exploration” mode where those representations can change 
based on environmental influences. Similarly, Durstewitz and Seamans (2008) propose a 
model based on broad influences in the dopamine system, which shifts the brain between 
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a stable (“D1”), and a flexible (“D2”) state, again corresponding to the extent to which 
representations are influenced by the external environment.  
 From a somewhat independent trajectory, the aging literature has converted on a 
similar idea, that perhaps many of the cognitive deficits observed in older adults could 
actually be attributed to a bias towards a more flexible (updating) mode. This was 
prompted largely from the finding that, despite the well-accepted notion that older adults 
show deficits in executive control, they show relatively spared performance on specific 
measures, such as switch costs in task switching (Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 
2001). At the same time, they show profound deficits in the same tasks when comparing 
performance between longer task-switching versus single-task blocks (so-called “global 
costs”; Mayr, 2001; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000). Mayr (2001) proposed that a 
parsimonious explanation for this effect is older adults’ reliance on costly set-updating 
strategy. Further work examining this question more closely using eye tracking found 
that older adults were less prone to switch to a more stable state when explicitly 
prompted to, and that this was primarily due to a tendency to fixate on irrelevant cues in 
the environment (Spieler, Mayr, & Lagrone, 2006). This is consistent with other aging 
work in the memory literature that has found that older adults adopt costly strategies that 
rely on external information, even when they are capable of performing well when the 
information is taken away (Rogers, Hertzog, & Fisk, 2000). Lindenberger and Mayr 
(2014) summarize these and other findings to suggest that with older age, comes a 
tendency towards “chronic updating” where older adults are much more often in this 
global updating state. The reason this has been overlooked is that cognitive tasks can vary 
on the extent of their reliance on the external environment. Many of the common tasks 
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used require focused attention, and thus older adults show large deficits, but as in the case 
of task switching, adopting a more flexible, updating state can be less harmful or even 
beneficial.  
 From a functional and a neurobiological level, the adoption of these global control 
states seems to be a plausible mechanism by which executive control operates. The aging 
literature also lends some support that older adults are “stuck” in the updating state. What 
has yet to be established are the dynamics of these states, how they ebb and flow in 
complex task environments. One straightforward question concerns the timescale of these 
states. Some of the work suggests that the maintenance state may be more of a default, 
with rapid updates to quickly refresh from the environment (O’Reilly, 2006; Aston-Jones 
& Cohen, 2005). But the aging literature suggests that updating may occur over much 
large timescales. Thus one can examine whether an updating state appears to be a 
transient phenomenon, or extends over longer periods of time. Another unexamined 
question is the extent that updating is exogenously- or endogenously-driven, in other 
words, triggered by the task context, or operating in a more random fashion (or both). 
Lastly, the age differences as summarized in Lindenberger and Mayr (2014) actually do 
not directly examine the question whether older adults are “chronic updaters”, thus a 
direct test of this hypothesis is needed.  
 In the present project, we aimed to answer the above questions, which carry 
considerable methodological challenges. First, as mentioned above, being in a 
maintenance or updating state can have different behavioral consequences depending on 
the context, and thus they are difficult to infer unless there is some crisp distinction 
between them. In Chapter II, we build off of previous work developing a paradigm to 
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specifically distinguish between maintenance and updating states (Mayr, Kuhns, & 
Hubbard, 2014). This is accomplished by having single-task blocks that promote a 
maintenance mode, punctuated by unpredictable, forced updates. By examining 
performance time-locked to these forced updates, we examine the consequences of 
updating, and test specifically how older adults respond differently to this context. 
Additionally, we use eye tracking in order to probe the allocation of attention throughout 
the trial in addition to the ultimate response, again time-locked to the forced updates. At 
each step we directly address the hypothesis of whether older adults are more prone to 
update. In Chapter III, we have similar forced updates, but we also specifically examine 
endogenously-driven updates that occur in intervening trials. We’re able to do this by 
using eye tracking in a paradigm where participants can fixate on peripheral, irrelevant 
cues. Since these occur in an unambiguous task context, we use these cue fixations as an 
indicator of being in an updating state, and we specifically examine how these updates 
may be triggered by local task factors (e.g., conflict, errors), the global task context 
(single versus mixed-task blocks), or completely independent from these (i.e., 
endogenously-driven). At each level we also probe the extent to which they’re sensitive 
to age differences. 
While these data are convincing, they carry the limitations inherent in all 
behavioral work, where we must infer the information processing steps, while only being 
able to observe the ultimate outputs (RTs, eye movements). Ideally, the most powerful 
method would be to directly observe how different features of the task environment are 
processed with high temporal resolution. Accordingly, we developed a task-switching 
paradigm similar to those used in chapters II and III and in previous eye tracking work 
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(Mayr, Kuhns, & Rieter, 2013; Kikumoto, Hubbard, & Mayr, 2015), but adapted for 
electroencephalography (EEG) to measure brain activity on a millisecond timescale. 
Then, using machine learning techniques, we examine the extent to which we can extract 
information regarding each task element at each timepoint, including those which cannot 
be observed from behavior, such as the abstract task set. Further, we do this on a trial-by-
trial level, circumventing the limitations imposed by other averaging techniques, like 
event-related potentials. These data provide the initial foundation to build on, in order to 
further address the questions explored in chapters II and III. Next, we can extend the 
paradigm to see how these abstract representational codes are modified by more stable or 
flexible task contexts (e.g., single versus mixed blocks, or high versus low switch rate 
blocks), while harnessing the high-fidelity measures developed in Chapter IV. This study 
was co-designed with Atsushi Kikumoto, who also provided technical background and 
details regarding the EEG data collection and preprocessing, and the main text (but not 
the extended methods) was co-written with Ulrich Mayr.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
EXAMINING “CHRONIC UPDATING” IN OLDER AGE 
 
Introduction 
Executive control is considered the construct responsible for the orchestration of 
coherent, goal-directed behavior, which operates across varied contexts and time scales. 
Consequently, disruptions in executive control can lead to profound impairments in day-
to-day functioning. This has led many to suggest that age-related cognitive decline is 
related to a breakdown of executive control specifically, since older adults exhibit a wide 
array of impairments (Kausler, 1991; Salthouse, 1991; Royall et al., 2004). This is also 
unsurprising given that executive control is associated with function of the prefrontal 
cortex (PFC), which undergoes large structural and functional changes in older age 
(Braver & West, 2008; Raz, 2000). Historically, a number of tasks have been used to 
index the strength or quality of executive control (e.g., Stroop, Flanker, Wisconsin Card 
Sorting, Tower of Hanoi, task switching; Verhaeghen, 2011; Salthouse, 2005; Banich, 
2004), and in general many show reduced performance in older compared to younger 
adults. However, there are cases where older adults show relatively spared performance 
in executive control measures (Verhaeghen, 2011; Mayr, Kliegl, & Krampe, 1996; Mayr, 
2001; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000). One surprising, yet consistent finding is that older 
adults show little difference in switch costs in task switching (Kray & Lindenberger, 
2000; Mayr, 2001). This begs the question whether the apparent executive control deficits 
are the result of generalized degradation, or more specific alterations in component 
processes. One possibility that has been raised is that observed deficits in executive 
control arise from biases in more “global” processing states, which may be adaptive 
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under certain conditions, but detrimental in many laboratory tasks (Lindenberger & 
Mayr, 2014). This runs counter to the perspective that cognitive processes are simply 
declining or slowing with older age (e.g., Salthouse, 1996). 
These age-related biases in broad processing states have been most clearly 
articulated in the task switching literature, where typically age differences are prevalent 
in the “global” task context, but absent with regard to the “local” effects. In task 
switching, one can index the cognitive system's response to local shifts by comparing 
performance between task-switch and task-repeat trials within the same blocks (i.e., the 
classic switch cost). To index more global shifts in control, one can instead compare 
responses to task-repeat trials embedded within task-switching blocks to trials from 
separate single-task blocks (Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Lindenberger & Mayr, 2014; 
Mayr, 2001). This “global cost” indexes the system’s response to the same local demand 
(repeating the same task that was just performed), but with the global context of being in 
a switching environment or not. The common finding is that there are relatively small 
differences between age groups in local processing (switch costs), but robust differences 
in global costs (Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Mayr, 2001). According to Mayr (2001), the 
most parsimonious explanation for these patterns of results is that older adults show a 
greater reliance on set-updating processes in general. In other words, older adults are 
more inclined to update the task set based on information from the environment, instead 
of relying on endogenously-generated representations of task sets. Using this strategy 
during task-switching blocks will not harm performance as much, since the task itself 
requires one to update whenever a switch occurs. However, during single-task blocks, the 
more optimal strategy is to rely completely on endogenous task-set representations, since 
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the demands are unambiguous. Older adults do not adopt such a strategy in the single task 
blocks, and consequently show greater global costs. 
Spieler, Mayr, and Lagrone (2006) explored this question more closely, using a 
task switching paradigm in which the global demands shifted over the course of a block. 
In this paradigm, a block would start with cued task switching, but one of the tasks would 
“fade out” halfway through the block, leaving only one relevant task for the rest of the 
block. The currently-relevant tasks were indicated by peripheral cues on every trial, with 
the fade-out task clearly crossed out with a thick red line. Thus, the end of these blocks 
were equivalent to a single-task block, and responses on these trials were compared with 
pure single-task blocks. They found that this fade-out cost in particular was increased in 
older age, suggesting that older adults had difficulty shifting from task-switching to a 
single-task context within the same block. The younger adults, on the other hand, rapidly 
adjusted to the new context and showed equivalent performance to the control blocks. 
Spieler et al. (2006) were also able to examine these effects more closely using eye 
tracking. If older adults are more prone to update from the environment, then they would 
be more likely than the younger adults to attend to the task cues, particularly when they 
were no longer relevant (i.e., in the fade-out phase). When examining fixations to the 
peripheral task cues they found exactly that—the behavioral fade-out costs could be 
attributed to the cue fixations in particular. Critically, in a separate experiment in which 
the task cues were taken away during the fade-out phase, they found that older adults 
performed similarly to the younger adults, indicating that the fade-out costs were limited 
to situations where redundant information is present on the screen (Spieler et al., 2006). 
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 Lindenberger and Mayr (2014) summarize these and other findings and suggest 
that this dependence on the external environment may be a general pattern of aging that 
extends beyond the task-switching context. They suggest that it is often missed because 
different tasks vary on the extent that they rely on support from the environment versus 
internal task-set representations. Similar to Mayr (2001), they propose that with 
increasing age people adopt a costly “updating” policy more frequently. Both the 
concepts and the terminology come from previous computational work in working 
memory (O’Reilly, 2006). Here, “updating” refers to sampling from the environment and 
updating internal representations. This is in contrast to a “maintenance” mode where 
internal representations (e.g., task sets) are robustly maintained and resistant to what is 
occurring in the external environment. Lindengerger and Mayr (2014) suggest that older 
adults will sample from the environment even when the task context is unambiguous and 
they are actually capable of performing the task without external support (Spieler et al., 
2006; Rogers, Hertzog, & Fisk, 2000). In some cases, such a policy is beneficial, and 
may counteract the cognitive system’s compromised ability to maintain abstract task sets 
(Braver et al., 2001; Gazzaley, 2013), but in cases where the use of endogenous 
representations would lead to more efficient processing, such a policy can be detrimental. 
Importantly, adopting this updating mode of processing leads to costs only under specific 
circumstances, and not a generalized slowing of performance. This can explain why older 
adults can show spared performance in some executive control measures (i.e., local 
switch costs) but not others. While there is some indication across different studies that 
this “chronic” updating is a real phenomenon of aging, it has yet to be tested explicitly in 
a single study. What is needed is a paradigm that can clearly distinguish when the system 
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is in an updating versus a maintenance state. Mayr, Kuhns, & Hubbard (2014) developed 
such a paradigm, which promoted a maintenance mode in most trials, with unpredictable, 
forced updates. This basic setup allowed them to test competing theories regarding the 
mechanisms involved in task switching. They found that task switch effects could be 
better explained based on previous experiences with tasks stored in long term memory 
(LTM), rather than passive carry-over of control settings between adjacent trials. This 
and other work (Mayr & Bryck, 2005) found specific task-switching effects in the 
absence of immediate task switches. The present investigation uses the some of the data 
from Mayr et al. (2014) and adds an age-comparative sample (Experiment 1), but focuses 
on the costs associated with updating, rather than the specific task-switch effects reported 
previously. Specifically, we sought to provide more direct evidence that older adults are 
chronic updaters. Additionally, we collected an independent sample of younger and older 
adults who completed the same task with eye tracking (Experiment 2) to more precisely 
characterize how an updating state influences attentional allocation in both age groups.  
The paradigm used in Mayr et al., (2014) and in the present investigation involves 
the selection of spatial locations based either on endogenous attention (a centrally-located 
symbolic cue) or on exogenously-driven attention (a red, sudden-onset stimulus). By 
design, the exogenous task is easier to perform, as it has a more automatic pull on 
attention, while the endogenous task requires processing of the abstract cue. Participants 
perform single-task blocks of either the endogenous (hereafter, “endo”) or exogenous 
(hereafter, “exo”) task, and on some trials, conflict is added by presenting the stimulus 
for the irrelevant task. Embedded within these blocks but with a low probability (p = .25) 
are interruptions in which the stimuli are replaced by a math equation, requiring 
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participants to indicate whether it's true of false. The design is such that during the 
regular trials (between interruptions), the task is unambiguous and thus promotes a 
protected, maintenance state. The interruptions, on the other hand, result in a forced 
update, where the task set must be abandoned in order to solve the math equation. The 
trial immediately following the interruption requires further updating and retrieval of the 
task-relevant representations from LTM. Mayr et al. (2014) found that during these 
immediate post-interruption trials (i.e., in the updating state) the system is particularly 
susceptible to competing task sets that were not distracting just 2 trials earlier (i.e., the 
irrelevant stimuli on conflict trials). Mayr et al., (2014) also found that, as predicted by 
instance theories of LTM (Hintzman, 1986; Logan, 1988), having memory traces of the 
competing task sets were critical for these observed interference effects, and that 
performing the tasks under conditions of conflict increased the strength of these traces. 
This was supported by the use of 2 control groups, who performed only the endo or exo 
task throughout the experiment. For these participants, there were still “conflict” trials, 
but they had no history of the irrelevant tasks themselves. Having this control can thus 
distinguish effects driven by the distracting stimuli themselves from having a history with 
the competing task set. Lastly, we included for the older adults a group that performed 
both tasks like the Experimental group, but without any interruptions. This allowed us to 
obtain a cleaner comparison of being in a more global updating context or not.   
 As this paradigm involves the selection of spatial locations on the screen, in 
Experiment 2 we use eye tracking in order to examine how attention is directed 
throughout each trial, indexing how participants are distracted in the updating versus 
maintenance states. This approach has also been successfully used in previous work to 
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distinguish between different models of executive control in task-switching (Kikumoto, 
Hubbard, & Mayr, 2015; Mayr, Kuhns, & Rieter, 2013). One question we can answer 
with eye tracking which cannot be addressed with RTs alone is the extent to which the 
age differences are driven by early distraction from irrelevant items on-screen, versus 
later and more deliberative effects, such as double-checking.  
Across both experiments, the findings generally support the hypothesis that older 
adults are more prone to update, showing both larger costs following forced updates, as 
well as a persisting cost that extends over multiple trials after that. Most effects cannot be 
described in terms of general slowing in older adults. Further, the eye tracking results 
reveal that there are both early and late attentional influences that drive these behavioral 
costs, which are much larger in older adults. However, some effects were more subtle 
than anticipated, suggesting that the “chronic updating” either does not occur as 
frequently as the other findings suggest, or that older adults have other strategies to 
compensate for this tendency.  
  
Methods - Experiment 1 
Participants 
Participants were either undergraduates from the University of Oregon (n= 40) 
who participated for course credit, or seniors (age 65-80, M=70.6, SD=5.0) from the 
surrounding community in Eugene, OR (n=64). Data from the young group have been 
previously reported in Mayr et al., (2014), Experiment 1. 
Participants were assigned to one of 4 groups, which determined which of the 
tasks they were asked to perform throughout the experiment. The Experimental group (n 
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= 41) performed alternating blocks of the endo and exo task with the math equation 
interruptions, while two control groups either performed the endo or exo task throughout 
the experiment (n = 40, task counter-balanced across participants). Another control group 
of senior participants (n = 23) alternated between the endo and exo tasks, but without the 
math equation interruptions. 
Paradigm 
The stimuli for the basic paradigm is depicted in Figure 1. As mentioned above, 
the paradigm involves two tasks, designed to pit endogenously-controlled and exogenous 
attention against each other. Both tasks required participants to attend to a letter within a 
circular frame (diameter = 13 mm = 1.5°) presented along a larger circular array (radius = 
70 mm = 8°). Six of the circular frames remained on screen, and were always white on a 
black background. Additionally, on some trials a single, red frame appeared between any 
two of the white ones. During the response-stimulus interval (RSI, 1000 ms) these frames 
were filled with the “&” symbol (see trial sequence in Figure 2). With the stimulus onset 
one frame would contain either an L or R, and all other circles contained either P’s or T’s 
(note that Figures 1-3 show the stimuli for Experiment 2, which used P and K). Each 
trial, the task was to find the appropriate circle and press either the left or right arrow key, 
depending on whether it contained an L or R, respectively. In the center of the screen was 
a smaller array of circles (diameter of each = 4 mm = .5°; diameter of array = 14 mm = 
1.6°), corresponding to each of six large white circles. This small array served as a cue 
for the endo task. During the RSI these circles were filled with red, then at stimulus onset 
all but a single circle turned white. The remaining red circle indicated which of the large 
circles would be the target (i.e., contain an L or R). For the exo task, the target was 
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always the single red, sudden-onset frame that appeared between two of the white circles 
at stimulus onset. On these trials, this circle contained either an L or R. On conflict trials, 
the stimulus for the irrelevant task was presented along with the relevant one—so on 
endo conflict trials, the sudden-onset also appeared (but filled with a P or T), and on exo 
conflict trials, the central cue pointed to one of the white circles. On no-conflict exo 
trials, all central circles remained white. The block structure is depicted in Figure 3. 
Participants performed single-task blocks of 80 trials of either the endo or exo task 
(called the “center” and “surround” task, respectively). Performance in these single-task 
blocks was interrupted occasionally by math equation trials (Figure 3). On these 
interruption trials, a math equation (e.g., “7 * 8 24 = 32”) was presented instead of the 
regular displays and participants had to respond with a correct/incorrect judgment. The 
probability of correct equations was p = .5. Incorrect equations were off by ±1 or 2. 
Problems were constrained to produce solutions in the positive range. Participants used 
the arrow keys to indicate whether the equation was correct or incorrect (left key = 
incorrect, right key = correct). Immediately after responding the next endogenous or 
exogenous-task stimulus display appeared. For each trial, the probability of a number task 
was p = .25, with the constraint that two interruption trials could not occur consecutively. 
In case of either primary-task or interruption-task errors a short error tone occurred. 
Participants were cued about the relevant task at the beginning of each block. Participants 
were randomly assigned to 4 groups. In the Experimental group, they alternated between 
single-task blocks of the endo and exo task. Two Control groups performed either the 
endo or the exo task throughout the entire experiment. These participants were still 
exposed to conflict trials (e.g., showing a sudden-onset on an endo trial), but had no 
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history with the irrelevant task. This allowed us to cleanly distinguish between effects 
associated with the task stimuli themselves from those related to the LTM traces of each 
task. Lastly, for the older adults only, we had a group of No-Interruption Controls, who 
alternated between both tasks, but never encountered math trials. This gave us a clear 
index of being in an overall updating context. After 2 practice blocks, participants 
performed 8 blocks of 80 trials, for a total of 640 trials.  
 
 
Figure 1. Stimuli used in experiments 1 and 2. Two tasks (Endogenous and Exogenous) 
involve attending to either a central cue, or a peripheral, red sudden-onset. The task is 
always to attend to the appropriate circle and press the left key if it contains an L or right 
key if it contains an R. On conflict trials, the irrelevant stimulus is also presented.  
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Figure 2. Trial sequence. Example trial showing the response-stimulus interval and 
stimulus onset. Stimuli remained on-screen until a response was made. A brief auditory 
tone (100 ms) was emitted when errors occurred.   
 
 
Figure 3. Sequence of trials and interruptions. Each block consisted of a single task, 
which was instructed at the beginning. Interruptions (math equations trials) appeared 
unpredictably and remained on screen until a response was made (correct/incorrect). Note 
that the numbers that indicate the post-interruption trial number, used in the subsequent 
analyses. After the interruption, the main task proceeded as before.   
 
Methods - Experiment 2 
Participants 
As in Experiment 1, participants were either undergraduate students at the 
University of Oregon who participated for course credit (n = 23), or seniors (n =22; age 
65-80, M = 70.4, SD = 4.0) recruited from the surrounding community in Eugene, OR. 
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Stimuli 
The timing and basic stimulus setup of Experiment 2 was the same as the 
Experimental group in Experiment 1 (see Figure 1), but with small differences in 
stimulus dimensions and colors. Participants were seated approximately 65 cm from the 
screen. The stimulus frames (diameter of each circle = 21 mm = 1.9 degrees) were 
presented around a virtual circle with a radius of 71 mm (5.4 degrees). The sudden-onset 
frame was presented between these positions along a slightly larger virtual circle (radius 
= 86 mm = 6.6 degrees). As in Experiment 1, the six white stimulus frames contained the 
“&” symbol during the RSI (1000 ms, Figure 2), but task-irrelevant circles contained the 
letters P or K. The cue circles (diameter of each circle= 7 mm = 0.6 degrees) were 
arranged in the same manner as in Experiment 1, but instead of always being red during 
the RSI, could be presented in one of 6 possible colors (green, blue, yellow, orange, 
magenta, or purple). The color of the central circles varied randomly from trial to trial, 
but did not repeat across 2 consecutive trials. Likewise, the color of the sudden-onset 
circle varied across trials, but was always a different color from the central cue. These 
alternative colors were included to rule out the possibility that the color red, or any low-
level priming due to the color, could be responsible for the effects observed in 
Experiment 1. The color did not lead to any significant differences and was disregarded 
in the analysis. The parameters of the math trials were the same as in Experiment 1, but 
the equation was always presented at a random location on the screen instead of the 
center, in order to eliminate any bias towards the central cue on immediate post-
interruption trials. 
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Eye Tracking 
Eye movements were measured using the SR Research desk-mounted Eyelink 
1000, controlled by the Eyelink Toolbox in MATLAB (Cornelissen, Peters, & Palmer, 
2002) at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz. Fixations were recorded when neither a blink nor a 
saccade was present, and saccades were defined for each pair of successive data samples 
for which the velocity of eyes exceeded 30°/s or the acceleration surpassed 8,000°/s2. 
Calibration for eye position registration occurred after the end of the practice blocks and 
repeated every 2 blocks. 
Procedure 
Like Experiment 1, participants performed single-task blocks of either the 
endogenous or exogenous task. Additionally, in order to obtain a more pure measure of 
the maintenance state, Experiment 2 used within-subjects manipulation where half of all 
blocks did not contain any math equation interruptions, just as the no-interruption 
controls in Experiment 1. Participants alternated between pairs of blocks with and 
without interruptions, and were informed at the beginning of each block whether it would 
contain math equations. The probability of an interruption was the same as in Experiment 
1 (p = .25). Task blocks occurred in an ABBA sequence, with one AB pair containing 
interruptions, and the second pair without interruptions. These pairs always included one 
endo and one exo block (order counter-balanced across subjects). The order of no-
interruption blocks was counter-balanced across participants. After 2 initial practice 
blocks, participants performed 12 blocks of 80 trials each. 
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Results - Experiment 1 
Analysis 
A total of 4 senior participants were excluded from analysis for failing to 
complete the experiment, leaving a total of 60 seniors for analysis (n = 20 for each 
group). The younger sample, as reported previously, included n = 20 in the Experimental, 
and n = 20 in the control group. For all analyses, we excluded error trials, math equation 
trials, trials after errors (whether they occurred after math equations or the standard 
tasks), and trials with RTs slower than 4000 ms. To statistically test for the behavioral 
effects, we used linear mixed effects modeling, using sum/deviation contrast coding (-.5 
vs. .5) for the factors Conflict, Task, Experimental group, and Age group (young= -.5, old 
= .5). As in Mayr et al., (2014), we focus the analysis on the difference between updating 
trials that immediately follow interruptions (math equations), and maintenance trials that 
occur in the rest of the experiment (trial 2+ following the last interruption, see Figure 3). 
In the previous work, it was evident that younger adults enter the maintenance state by 
the second trial following an interruption, but in an additional step, we examine whether 
this is true of the older adults by comparing trials 2 and beyond following the 
interruption. For simplicity, trials exceeding 8 trials from the last interruption were coded 
as 8. We believed this provided reasonable interpretability of the results, and guarded 
against outliers (i.e., really long runs without interruptions) driving the effects. Trials that 
preceded the first interruption of the block were excluded from the analysis. Thus we can 
define the maintenance state as the point where RTs level off following the interruption, 
allowing us to index how many trials it takes to re-enter this state. Unless specified 
otherwise, all within-subject main effects were also included as random effects for each 
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subject. Analyses we carried out using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015). For each result, we report the unstandardized estimate and the 
corresponding t value. As p values cannot be reliably deduced from these models 
(Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008, Footnote 1) we report only t values, but use the 
general rule of thumb that a t exceeding 2.0 is statistically significant. 
Predictions 
The paradigm is designed such that throughout the single-task blocks, the system 
remains in a relatively protected (i.e., maintenance) state where task-relevant 
representations are robustly maintained in working memory and are resistant to 
interference. Interruption trials then necessitate an update of working memory in order to 
perform the task, and trials immediately following those interruptions again require 
updating and retrieving the task-relevant representations from LTM (Mayr et al., 2014). 
Importantly, any competing task-related representations that have left traces in LTM can 
enter working memory during this vulnerable state. Mayr et al., (2014) found that 
experience with the task under conditions of conflict increased the strength of these LTM 
traces (Logan, 1988), and consequently, the updating effects observed. The control 
groups were included in order to test this LTM trace account explicitly—if the observed 
updating effects are due to some aspect of the stimuli themselves, then we would expect 
the same results regardless of whether participants had experience with the irrelevant 
task. If, on the other hand, it has to do with the LTM traces left through experience with 
the other task, then the updating effect should be absent in the single-task control groups. 
The primary hypothesis, that older adults have a greater tendency to update, should have 
two main consequences in the present paradigm. First, we would expect a greater cost on 
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immediate post-interruption trials (i.e., the updating effect) for older adults, which should 
be larger in the Experimental group, and particularly large on conflict trials. Secondly, we 
expect that older adults will have a more difficult time entering a maintenance state—by 
examining the trials beyond the immediate post-interruption trial, we would expect a 
persisting cost for the older adults, while they younger adults re-enter a maintenance state 
by trial 2 post-interruption. This, again, is expected to be amplified by conflict, which can 
also be observed by comparing maintenance trials (i.e., trial 2+ following the last 
interruption) between the Experimental and the no-interruption control groups.  
 
Updating effect 
 Figure 4 depicts the mean RT across each experimental condition (Task, Conflict) 
and group (Age, Experimental/Control group), aligned to the last interruption (math) trial. 
Trials that are 8 or greater from the last interruption is coded as 8. In this figure and the 
following analyses, we used the data trimming procedures explained above. Note that on 
immediate post-interruption trials there is a substantial cost, particularly in the exo task 
(but also the endo task in the older group). As a first step, we examined this updating 
effect—the increase in RT on immediate post-interruption trials—as a function of 
experimental condition and age group using linear mixed-effects modeling. We used a 
single Update factor coding for the immediate post-interruption, and since the control 
groups only performed a single task, we run a separate model for each task to compare 
across the Experimental and Control groups. To make sure we are comparing updating 
trials to true baseline performance, we also exclude trial 2 post-interruption from this 
analysis, since the overall patterns suggest that older adults do not return to baseline until 
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around trial 3 (Figure 4). This is explicitly tested in analysis of the maintenance trials 
below. All results from these two models are presented in Table 1, with those of 
theoretical interest in bold. Of particular interest is the Age x Experimental x Update 
interaction, which would indicate an increased updating cost for the older adults (relative 
to the control participants), as well as the Age x Experimental x Update x Conflict 
interaction indicating an even stronger cost on post-interruption, conflict trials. As 
evident in Table 1, the Age x Experimental x Update interaction was significant for the 
endo task (b = 132, t = 2.28) but not for the exo task (b = 81, t = .89). However, the Age x 
Experimental x Update x Conflict interaction was significant for both tasks (endo, b = 
109, t = 2.01; exo, b = 193, t = 3.41), suggesting that conflict is particularly harmful to 
performance on the post-interruption trials for the older adults.  
Focusing on the exo task in Figure 4, it is clear that the older adults in the control 
condition show an updating effect, while this is not true of the younger adults. While this 
was not necessarily expected, it was expected that the conflict effect should only be 
present for the Experimental condition, which is true in both age groups, but larger for 
the older adults. As a follow-up, we also examined whether the Age x Experimental x 
Update interaction is evident in each conflict condition. Accordingly, we ran 4 additional 
models testing for this interaction in each level of Conflict and Task. As seen in Table A1 
in the Appendix, the interaction is evident selectively in the endo, conflict trials (b = 184, 
t = 2.24). Together, the results indicate that older adults are indeed more perturbed by the 
interruption, and that this is particularly exaggerated in conditions of conflict, a pattern 
that is consistent with an increased tendency to update following the enforced update of 
the math trial.  
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Figure 4. RT Results from Experiment 1.  
 
Return to Maintenance State 
 As a next step, we want to examine differences in the trials following the 
immediate post-interruption trial. If older adults are prone to be stuck in an updating 
state, then we would expect an effect of the interruption that extends beyond the 
immediate post-interruption. Figure 4 suggests that this may be the case, particularly in 
the exo task, since RTs return almost immediately to baseline for younger adults, but 
seem to decline gradually in the older adults. We test for this effect by looking at the 
steepness of the decline in RTs as the trial moves away from the last interruption, and the 
extent to which it is steeper for older adults. Accordingly, we excluded the immediate 
post-interruption trial, and focused on the linear effect of trials 2-8 post-interruption (with 
8 also including trials 9 and above) using two more models (one for each task).  The post-
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interruption trial number was first centered and used in as a predictor along with 
Experimental group, Conflict and Age, while controlling for quadratic effects across the 
post-interruption trials. Thus a significant (negative) linear effect would reflect a gradual 
decline in RTs in trials beyond the immediate post-interruption. Somewhat surprisingly, 
there was a significant main Linear effect for the exo task (b = -8, t = 4.32) indicating a 
gradual decline across all groups (Table A2). But this was in the presence of the expected 
Linear x Age interaction (b= -11, t = 3.11), indicating a steeper decline for older adults. 
There was also an Experimental x Linear interaction in the exo task (b = -12, t = 3.45), 
indicating a more gradual decline for the experimental group relative to controls; the Age 
x Experimental x Linear interaction was in the expected direction, but non-significant (b 
= -12, t = 1.71). Lastly, there was a Linear x Conflict interaction (b = -7, t = 2.69) 
indicating a more gradual decline for conflict trials, but this did not interact with Age. We 
did not observe any linear effects in the endo task, which is unsurprising given the pattern 
in Figure 4. Overall, the results suggest that there is indeed a more gradual decline in RTs 
for the older adults in the exo task, particularly in the conflict trials, and the experimental 
group. We also repeated the analysis, running a model for each task and age group 
separately. In the exo task, the older adults showed a main Linear effect (b = -13, t = 
4.80), an Experimental x Linear interaction (b = -18, t = 3.33), and a Conflict x Linear 
interaction (b = -11, t = 2.61). For the exo task in the young adults, the only significant 
effect was the Experimental x Conflict x Linear interaction (byoung = -15, t = 2.82).  For 
the endo task, the only significant effect across both age groups was an Experimental x 
Conflict x Linear effect for the older adults (b = -21, t = 1.97). These results are 
consistent with the overall model, and show that the older adults show a more gradual 
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decline to the maintenance state, but that the younger adults do show a similar effect in 
the exo, conflict trials in the Experimental group, which as reported in Mayr et al., (2014) 
have the most potent updating effects.   
 
Table 1. Overall Model for Experiment 1 
 
No-interruption Controls 
 Figure 5 repeats the mean RTs for the older experimental group presented along 
the performance by the no-interruption control group (which contained only older adults). 
Table 1. Overall Model for Experiment 1
estimate t
Endo Task
Age 539 8.39
Experimental 125 1.94
Conflict 136 9.86
Update 71 4.89
Age x Experimental 185 1.44
Age x Conflict 147 5.34
Experimental x Conflict 104 3.78
Age x Update 103 3.56
Experimental x Update 71 2.46
Conflict x Update 30 2.28
Age x Experimental x Conflict 134 2.42
Age x Experimental x Update 132 2.28
Age x Conflict x Update 44 1.70
Experimental x Conflict x Update 84 3.25
Age x Experimental x Conflict x Update 110 2.13
Exo Task
Age 413 7.61
Experimental 74 1.37
Conflict 62 7.02
Update 213 8.47
Age x Experimental 63 0.58
Age x Conflict 36 2.04
Experimental x Conflict 112 6.33
Age x Update 238 4.73
Experimental x Update 142 2.81
Conflict x Update 91 6.44
Age x Experimental x Conflict 148 4.20
Age x Experimental x Update 76 0.76
Age x Conflict x Update 28 0.99
Experimental x Conflict x Update 189 6.69
Age x Experimental x Conflict x Update 193 3.41
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With the other control groups, we wanted to capture the effect of updating that arose as a 
consequence of the memory traces associated with each task, whereas in this group we 
attempt to capture the cost of being in an updating versus no-updating context. Since 
there were no interruptions in this control groups, we compared performance on 
maintenance trials in the experimental group to the controls. The critical questions here 
are whether there’s an overall cost to being in this updating context (i.e., a main effect of 
Experimental) and whether this interacts with Conflict. Since these control participants 
completed both tasks, we include a single model including both tasks and an additional 
Task factor. Results are presented in Table A3, which and show a larger Conflict effect in 
the Experimental group (b = 47, t = 2.16), which was further increased in the endo task (b 
= 102, t = 3.32). As a follow up we use two additional models (one for each task) to 
examine to what extent the effects are present in both tasks. This analysis indicated that 
both effects were present in the endo task, which is unsurprising given the small conflict 
effect in maintenance trials for the exo task (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. No-interruption control group in Experiment 1 for both the endo (green) and 
exo (blue) tasks. Control participants are depicted as horizontal lines, with the older 
adults in the Experimental group repeated from Figure 4.  
 
 
Controlling for General Slowing  
 The models above suggest that age differences in this paradigm are particularly 
sensitive to the updating context, however it can be difficult to rule out the alternative 
hypothesis that the observed effects are due to generalized slowing which happen to 
occur on the slowest, post-interruption trials. This is a general concern in the aging 
literature, and many have found that when controlling for generalized slowing effects, the 
age differences aren’t as broad as they seem on the surface (c.f., Mayr et al., 1996; 
Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002; Verhaeghen, 2011). One way to account for such effects is 
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to examine performance in older and younger adults as a function of how much they 
deviate from some baseline condition in the experiment (Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002). In 
Experiment 1, we have the control group which only has experience with one of the 
tasks. When comparing them to the Experimental group, we can isolate the cost 
associated with updating when competing LTM traces of multiple tasks are present (Mayr 
et al., 2014), which is why the Age x Experimental x Update interaction was of particular 
interest in the overall analysis. To address the present question, we can look at 
performance in a similar manner as Figure 4, but for the Experimental group calculated 
the percent change from the corresponding control group. Since generalized slowing in 
the older adults should be present in both groups, by baselining to this performance, we 
emphasize the differences that are specific to the Experimental group. By calculating as a 
percent difference, we also normalize both age groups with respect to the degree of 
increase in RT as well—in other words, a 100 ms increase in the younger group may be 
more meaningful than the same increase in the older group. Thus we first calculated the 
group mean performance for the control group for each experimental factor, and for trials 
1-5 post-interruption. For the Experimental group, we then calculated the average RT for 
each condition and post-interruption trial (1-5), and calculated the percent change from 
the corresponding control group. The average deviations from the control groups are 
depicted in Figure 6. As evident, there are large effects in the immediate post-interruption 
trials for the older adults above that of the younger adults. This suggests that there is 
indeed an extra cost for the older adults in these trials, above and beyond general 
slowing. To test this, we submitted the percent change values to 2 repeated-measures 
ANOVAs. The first examined the updating effect, contrasting the immediate post-
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interruption trials to the rest, with the within-subjects factors of Task, Conflict, and 
Update, and Age as a between-subjects factor. In this analysis, there was a main effect for 
the Update factor (F(1,39) = 39.92, p < .001) as well as an Update x Task interaction 
(F(1,39) = 25.92, p < .001), and an Update x Task x Age interaction (F(1,39) = 6.69, p = 
.01), indicating a larger effect for the exo task, which was even larger for the older adults. 
We ran a second model examining the linear effect of the post-interruption trials 
(excluding the immediate post-interruption) to see if older adults were also slower to 
return to maintenance when controlling for general slowing. This model showed a main 
linear effect for the post-interruption trial, F(1,39) = 19.73, p < .001, but not the expected 
interaction with Age (p = .13). There was also an interaction with Task (F(1,39) = 6.67, p 
= .01), and Conflict (F(1,39) = 19.24, p < .001) indicative of the steeper slope in the exo 
task and on conflict trials for both age groups. These factors did not further interact with 
age (all p’s > .35). Together the results suggest that there is indeed a difference in the 
older group that can be attributed to the updating state per se and not just general 
slowing, but that the age difference in returning to the maintenance state may be a more 
subtle effect that is at least partly driven by slowing in older adults.  
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Figure 6. Visualizing performance in the Experimental group as a percentage change 
from the Control group in Experiment 1.   
 
 
 
Results - Experiment 2 
Out of the 45 participants, 2 younger and 4 older participants were excluded due 
to failing to complete the experiment, leaving a total of 21 younger and 18 older for 
analysis. Mean RTs for Experiment 2 are depicted in Figure 7. We used the same data 
trimming procedures as in Experiment 1, excluding error trials, math equation trials, trials 
after errors (whether they occurred after math equations or the standard tasks), and trials 
with RTs slower than 4000 ms. Trials were again analyzed based on their relation to the 
interruption, from 1 to 4+ trials post-interruption (and trials 1-8+ for the linear effect), 
using the same multilevel modeling techniques as in Experiment 1. In order to gain a 
cleaner index of the updating cost in this experiment, half of the blocks did not contain 
any interruptions, allowing for the same comparisons as in the no-interruption controls in 
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Experiment 1, but in a within-subjects manner. We will first focus on the behavioral 
effects in the experimental blocks (which included interruptions) as a replication of the 
results in Experiment 1. 
  
 
Figure 7. Mean RTs for Experiment 2. The no-interruption control blocks are depicted as 
horizontal lines, with solid lines indicating conflict trials.  
  
Updating Effect 
Similar to Experiment 1, we begin with an overall model specifically focusing on 
the Age x Updating effect. We restrict this initial analysis to the Experimental blocks 
only, and compare the no-interruption control blocks in a separate model. Again we focus 
on RT on immediate post-interruption trials, but since we do not have the same single-
task control, examine the effect across both tasks. Thus the model contains the factors 
Task, Conflict, and Age. Again we exclude trial 2 post-interruption as it does not appear 
to reflect true baseline performance in the older adults. The results of this model are 
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presented in Table A4. In this analysis, there was a significant Age x Update interaction 
(b = 153, t = 3.74) indicating an overall increased updating effect for the older adults. 
This did not interact with Task or Conflict, however. Running separate models within 
each task revealed that the Age x Update effect was present in both tasks (bExo = 159, t = 
2.87; bEndo = 162, t = 3.21). Running a separate model within each level of Conflict 
(Table 7) revealed that the Age x Update effect was also present in conflict and no-
conflict trials as well (bNoC = 138, t = 3.61; bCon= 177, t = 3.54). These results replicate 
those of Experiment 1 in that the updating effect is larger for the older adults, but a 
notable difference is the presence of an updating effect for the younger adults in the endo 
task. However, this effect was significantly smaller in the endo task for the younger 
adults (b = -101, t = 5.54). 
 
Return to Maintenance 
 As in Experiment 1, there does appear to be a more gradual decline towards 
baseline performance for the older adults, particularly in the exo task. We repeated the 
same analysis examining the overall decrease of RT across post-interruption trials, 
excluding immediate post-interruption trials, and looking at the linear effect of trials 2-8+ 
post-interruption, while controlling for the quadratic effect. This revealed a main Linear 
effect across all conditions and age groups (see Table A5; b = -3.6, t = 1.97) as well as an 
interaction with Age (b = -7, t = 1.97), and with Conflict (b = -6, t = 2.65), but no Age x 
Linear x Conflict interaction. Thus there does seem to be a more gradual decline in RT 
across the post-interruption trials which is steeper in older adults, and is also steeper in 
conflict trials. Repeating this analysis separately within each age group showed a main 
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Linear effect (b = -7, t = 3.19) and a Linear x Conflict interaction (b = -8, t = 2.66) in the 
older adults only. Younger adults did show a Linear x Task interaction (b = -7, 2.25), 
however. Together the results converge well with those of Experiment 1, which show a 
slower decline to the maintenance state in the older adults, and in conflict trials. A 
somewhat different pattern is that we see these effects across both tasks, whereas it was 
only present for the exo task in Experiment 1.   
 
Table 2. Overall Model for Experiment 2 
 
Table 6. Models Examining Updating Effect in Experiment 2
estimate t
Both Tasks
Age 297 5.69
Task 293 43.57
Conflict 153 13.46
Update 212 10.35
Age x Task 128 9.52
Age x Conflict 70 3.08
Task x Conflict 111 8.22
Age x Update 153 3.74
Task x Update -98 -7.29
Conflict x Update 111 8.25
Age x Task x Conflict 90 3.32
Age x Task x Update 23 0.85
Age x Conflict x Update 37 1.36
Task x Conflict x Update -72 -2.68
Age x Task x Conflict x Update -25 -0.46
Endo Task
Age 358 5.53
Conflict 207 11.45
Update 163 6.46
Age x Conflict 112 3.09
Age x Update 162 3.21
Conflict x Update 75 3.72
Age x Conflict x Update 18 0.44
Exo Task
Age 239 4.51
Conflict 92 9.22
Update 257 9.31
Age x Conflict 5 0.26
Age x Update 159 2.87
Conflict x Update 139 8.51
Age x Conflict x Update 12 0.36
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No-Interruption Control Blocks 
As in Experiment 1, we wanted to compare performance on the no-interruption 
control blocks (horizontal lines in Figure 7) to the Experimental blocks as an index of the 
cost of being in an updating context. Accordingly, used a mixed-effects model comparing 
RTs in maintenance trails in the Experimental blocks (excluding trials 1 and 2 post-
interruption) to all trials in the control blocks, with Age, Task, and Conflict as additional 
predictors. This analysis revealed a main effect of the updating context (b = 11.81, t = 
2.25), and an interaction with Conflict (b = 17.40, t = 2.70) indicating slower RTs and 
larger conflict effects in the experimental blocks. However, this did not interact with Age, 
suggesting that both groups were affected similarly by being in the updating context.  
 
Controlling for General Slowing  
We conducted a similar procedure as in Experiment 1 in order to address the 
notion that the age differences are attributed to general slowing effects. However, in this 
case we do not have the same control group that had experience with only one task. 
Instead, we compared performance on the experimental blocks to the no-interruption 
control blocks. This is a slightly different comparison compared to Experiment 1, and 
captures the cost associate with being in an updating versus non-updating context. 
Nevertheless, any age differences that manifest while controlling for these blocks will be 
difficult to attribute to general slowing effects. Thus for each participant, task condition, 
and post-interruption trial (1-5) we computed the percent deviation from the control block 
performance. The average deviations are depicted in Figure 8. Note that they show a 
similar pattern to that in Experiment 1, where older adults show larger costs on 
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immediate post-interruption trials, above-and-beyond general slowing effects. Again we 
submitted these values to 2 repeated-measures ANOVAs. The first model examined the 
updating effect, and found a main effect of updating (F(1,37) = 121, p < .001), and an 
Age x Update interaction (F(1,37) = 7.07, p = .01). This model also revealed a larger 
updating effect in the exo task (F(1,37) = 24.9, p < .001), and in conflict trials (F(1,37) = 
20.5, p < .001), but no other age interactions. In the ANOVA examining the linear effect 
of trials 2-5, we found only a marginally significant Linear x Task effect (F(1,35) = 3.59, 
p = .07), but no other age interactions.  
 
 
Figure 8. Visualizing performance in the experimental blocks as a percentage change 
from the control blocks in Experiment 2.  
 
 
Eye Movements 
 Next we look at the eye movements in Experiment 2 to shed light on how the 
updating costs described above occur. One question that is difficult to address from the 
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RTs alone is the extent to which the costs are due to early distraction by irrelevant items 
on the screen or later double-checking of those items. If, for instance, updating is really a 
result of a more deliberative process, where the participants are simply being 
conscientious about returning to the task, then we would expect differences in the later 
part of the trial. If updating is associated more with involuntary distraction, then we 
would expect differences primarily in the early part of the trial.  We began by 
establishing elliptical regions of interest (ROIs) around the sudden-onset exo stimulus (if 
present), the endo stimulus (if present), and a circular ROI around the central endo cue. 
For each item, any fixation that fell within the ROI after stimulus onset was coded as a 
“hit” (1) and all other fixations were coded as misses (0). The elliptical regions ensure 
that fixations directed towards adjacent items on the screen are not coded as hits, but 
those that under- or overshoot the item are still identified. Eye tracking data were 
preprocessed using the itrackR package in R (http://github.com/jashubbard/itrackR). 
Using the fixations that were coded as hits or misses for each item, we then calculated the 
probability of a fixation each item across time for the first 500 ms following stimulus 
onset. For simplicity, this interval was broken into 25ms bins. For each time bin, if any 
fixations during that time were coded as a hit (1) then that bin was coded as a 1. If all 
fixations that occurred within that time bin missed the item of interest, then that bin was 
coded as 0. If no fixations occurred during a given time bin, then the bin was coded as 
missing data. Thus each trial was represented as a binary vector indicating whether an 
item was fixated and at what time. Averaging across trials gives a representation of the 
probability of fixating an item across time. Similar to the behavioral analyses, we 
examine the attentional dynamics for each task and conflict condition, relative to the last 
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interruption. For simplicity we depict only up to 4 trials post-interruption. These time-
courses are depicted in Figures 9-10. As a reference for baseline performance, fixations 
towards each item on the no-interruption control blocks are depicted in gray and repeated 
across each panel. Thus the extent that fixations deviate from this baseline can be thought 
of as the cost associated with the updating context.  
Figure 9 depicts the fixations over time for the exo task, separately for each age 
group, conflict condition, and post-interruption trial. Separate lines indicate the different 
items (the exo target versus central cue). Fixations towards the endo stimulus are not 
shown because they were very few trials where this item was fixated on the conflict trials. 
Examining the immediate post-interruption trials (the first row), clear age differences 
emerge. First, on conflict trials fixations towards the irrelevant central cue are increased 
for older adults across the entire time interval, suggesting both early distraction (before 
200ms) but also later double-checking throughout the interval. The younger adults, by 
contrast, show only a slight pull towards the cue compared to baseline blocks around 
200-500ms after stimulus onset. Fixations towards the task-relevant stimulus are also 
greatly reduced in the older adults in these trials, starting from very early in the trial 
(~150ms for young, ~200ms for old). Younger adults also show a reduction in fixations 
across the time interval, but to a smaller degree compared to the older adults. For the 
younger adults, by trial 3 post-interruption the target fixations approach that of the 
control blocks, particularly within the first ~250 ms of the trial, and fixations to the cue 
are essentially absent. For older adults, there is a greater deviation from the control 
blocks, even in the early part of the trial across all but trial 4+, and there is some 
indication of distraction by the central cue even by trial 4 post-interruption.  
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Turning to the no-conflict trials we can see that, despite the fact that the central 
cue is blank on these trials, older adults are nonetheless dwelling on this item in the 
immediate post-interruption trials, and this effect persists for the next couple of trials. As 
in the conflict trials, target fixations also show a greater deviation from the control blocks 
in the older adults on the immediate post-interruption trials in the early portion of the trial 
(< 250 ms) and persisting throughout the interval. For the older adults, this early 
deviation is present even in trials 2-3 post-interruption, while in younger adults this 
difference is almost absent by trial 2. As in the conflict trials, even in trial 4 post-
interruption, older adults show a reduction in target fixations throughout the interval, 
while younger adults essentially return to baseline performance. Overall, examining the 
fixations over time reveals that the costs observed updating effects in the RTs arise from 
the eyes dwelling on the central cue early in the trial, but also a reduced tendency to 
fixate the target later in the trial. In older adults, this seems to occur even when the 
central cue is not indicating the conflicting task. They also reveal a delayed tendency to 
fixate the exo target in the early part of the trial, extending beyond the immediate post-
interruptions, particularly for the older adults.  
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Figure 9. Fixation tim
e-courses for exo trials, relative to stim
ulus onset. R
ow
s indicate the post-interruption trial (1-4+), w
hile the age 
groups and conflict conditions are in colum
ns. The tim
e-course for the control blocks is depicted in gray and repeated across all 4 
panels. V
ertical lines indicate w
ithin-subject confidence intervals calculated w
ithin each condition and age group (C
ousineau, 2005). 
N
ote that the endo stim
ulus w
as present on conflict trials, but is not displayed here because there w
ere very few
 fixations. 
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Endo Task Fixations 
Figure 11 depicts the corresponding time-courses for the endo trials. In the 
conflict trials, we show fixations towards all three possible items (central cue, endo 
target, and exo distractor) since there are a considerable number of fixations towards all 
items in these trials. This is by design, given the distractibility of the sudden-onset. 
Focusing on the conflict trials, we see that there is a dramatic difference in the immediate 
post-interruption trials, where there is a much larger tendency to fixate the exo distractor 
in the older adults (blue line). In fact, after 400ms post-stimulus, older adults are equally 
likely to be fixating the exo distractor and the central cue. These dynamics are very 
different from the control blocks, where older adults show a large bias towards the central 
cue. In the younger adults, there is an increased tendency to fixate the distractor (and 
decreased tendency to fixate the cue), but by 350 ms post-stimulus, the eyes are more 
likely to go towards the cue. Further, by trial 2 post-interruption the fixations look very 
similar to the control blocks, except for a small tendency to fixate the distractor early in 
the trial (200-300ms), and this is essentially eliminated by trial 3. In the older adults, by 
contrast, there is a sizeable disruption on trial 2, and an increase in distractor fixations 
that persists even in trial 3. This increased tendency to fixate on the distractor is also 
sustained over a longer period of the trial compared to the younger adults, particularly in 
trials 1-2. The no-conflict trials are shown for completeness, but were not expected to 
reveal as dramatic of age differences compared to the other conditions. Since the exo 
distractor was not present in these trials, only fixations towards the central cue and endo 
stimulus are shown. We still see the greatest deviation from baseline performance in the 
older adults in the immediate post-interruption trials, but this is completely resolved by 
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trial 2. Notably, for the older adults, we see both early and late deviations, again 
suggesting both early and late attentional components driving the RT effects.  
Together, the pattern suggests for the endo trials, the age differences are 
manifested in both early and later parts of the trial, in contrast with the exo task where 
arguably most of the meaningful differences were present in the early part of the trial. In 
line with the exo task, though, we see a much greater disruption immediately following 
the interruption trial in the older adults.
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Figure 10. Fixation tim
e-courses for endo trials, relative to stim
ulus onset. R
ow
s indicate the post-interruption trial (1-4+), w
hile the 
age groups and conflict conditions are in colum
ns. The tim
e-course for the control blocks is depicted in gray and repeated across all 4 
panels. V
ertical lines indicate w
ithin-subject confidence intervals calculated w
ithin each condition and age group (C
ousineau, 2005).
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Discussion 
In the present work, we examined age differences in a paradigm that can clearly 
distinguish between maintenance and updating modes of processing (Mayr et al., 2014). 
Using this paradigm allowed us to extend previous work suggesting that age differences 
in executive control can be described by a bias towards "chronic updating" in older 
adults. Across two different experiments, the results are generally consistent with this 
pattern, but the age differences were not quite as dramatic as expected. In the behavioral 
version of the task, we found that older adults exhibited greater interference immediately 
following interruptions. We also found that they took more trials to re-enter a protective, 
maintenance state than young adults, but unexpectedly, the younger adults also seemed to 
take more than a single trial to enter that state as well. It is important to note that these 
effects were seen in a context with no task-switching demands (beyond switching from 
the math task) since only one task was completed during each block; despite the fact that 
the task was unambiguous, we observed costs that extended beyond the immediate post-
interruption trial. Using control groups who only completed a single task throughout the 
experiment allowed us to distinguish effects driven by the stimuli themselves, versus 
those driven by having LTM traces of each task (Mayr et al., 2014). In the previous work, 
and in the age-comparative sample, we saw that having experience with both tasks leads 
to the strongest updating effect, particularly under conditions of conflict.  
One unexpected finding was the presence of an updating effect in endo task for the older, 
but not the younger group in Experiment 1. Note that for the younger sample, as reported 
in Mayr et al. (2014), the updating effect was only present for the exo task. As explained 
in Mayr et al. (2014) for the younger adults, the dominance of the exo task leads to them 
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lay relatively weak LTM traces while performing that task, since the endo distractor is 
easily ignored on maintenance trials, leading to little experienced conflict. Then, while 
performing the endo task, attention is drawn towards the distractor almost entirely by 
bottom-up exogenous attention (Theeuwes et al., 1998) rather than the LTM traces 
associated with the endo task. This operates similarly whether in the maintenance or 
updating state (Mayr et al., 2014).  The endo task, on the other hand, has strong LTM 
traces due to high experienced conflict when the exo stimulus was present. Then, when 
performing the exo task, these LTM traces have the greatest influence in the updating 
(post-interruption) state, leading to a strong updating effect (see Mayr et al., 2014 for 
more detail). This account can also explain why older adults may show an updating effect 
in the endo task—if they are less prone to enter a maintenance state, then they should 
experience more conflict on maintenance trials, even while performing the exo task. 
During the endo task, when they enter the updating state, attention is pulled both by 
exogenous attention and the strong LTM traces associated with the exo task. Importantly, 
this explanation is supported by comparison with the control groups; if the effects 
observed were a result of older adults being more distracted by the exo stimulus in 
general, then we would expect an equally large updating effect for both them and the 
experimental group, but instead we see a larger updating effect for those who experienced 
both tasks.  
For the older adults, the use of the no-interruption control group allowed us to 
have a baseline measure for the maintenance trials in the experimental group to more 
cleanly index the persisting cost associated with the forced update. This comparison 
revealed that older adults in the Experimental group show an increased cost in the 
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maintenance trials overall, and a larger conflict effect in both tasks as a result of being in 
this context. Thus, in addition to the greater tendency to be in an updating state, being in 
a context where forced updates are expected leads to greater interference throughout the 
experiment.  
One important alternative hypothesis to address regarding the age effects is the 
notion that the age differences are just a consequence of general slowing in older adults. 
To address this, in both experiments we compared performance in the experimental 
groups/blocks as a function of the corresponding control group/blocks. These analyses 
still revealed robust age-related updating effects, but little evidence regarding the gradual 
return to baseline performance. This suggests that the more gradual return to the 
maintenance state in older adults may be driven in part by general slowing in this group, 
but that the older adults are still uniquely sensitive to the updating trials that cannot be 
explained in this way.  
 Experiment 2 served as a replication of Experiment 1, and added eye tracking to 
provide additional insight into the allocation of attention throughout the trial. 
Additionally, we used a within-subjects design that compared performance on updating 
and non-updating blocks as an attempt to gain a cleaner baseline measure of the 
maintenance state. The behavioral results largely replicated the pattern seen in 
Experiment 1, with respect to the larger updating effect in older adults, and a more 
gradual decline towards the maintenance state. One notable exception was the unexpected 
updating effect in the endo task for the younger adults. This does go against the LTM 
trace account as described above and in Mayr et al., 2014, but notably this updating effect 
was much smaller when compared to the exo task for this group. In line with Experiment 
 47 
1, comparison with the no-interruption control blocks revealed an apparent persisting cost 
and increased conflict effect associated with being in an updating context but 
surprisingly, these effects did not interact with age. This was not expected, given the 
previous evidence suggesting that older adults are uniquely sensitive to such global costs 
(Mayr & Lindenberger, 2014), at least in the domain of task switching. It is possible that 
this manipulation was not successful inducing a change in global state as intended, and 
instead participants simply adopted a similar global strategy regardless of which block 
they were in. While the fixation time-courses suggest that attentional allocation might be 
more optimal on these control blocks, for the most part, participants reach this optimum 
performance on all but the first couple trials following the interruption, again suggesting 
that they’re operating similarly in both contexts. Clearly more work will be needed to 
confirm the effectiveness of this within-subject design. It may be that a between-subjects 
design is necessary in order to make meaningful comparisons regarding these updating 
costs.  
 Examining the patterns of fixations allowed us to directly address the question of 
whether the observed age-related updating effects are a consequence of early distraction 
by competing items on-screen, or later double-checking later in the trial. Accordingly, we 
examined how attention was directed towards the different items on the screen for each 
trial type, relative to the last interruption trial, and how the dynamics diverted from 
baseline performance on control blocks. Consistent with the behavioral results, we found 
that in the updating (immediate post-interruption) trials that older adults were 
disproportionately affected, and that they took more trials to approach baseline 
performance. For the updating trials in the exo task, the effects seemed to be driven both 
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by early and late components, with a larger tendency to fixate the endo cue in the early 
part of the trial, but also an increased tendency to fixate it throughout the trial. Younger 
adults, by contrast, showed a slower tendency to move the eyes towards the sudden onset 
in the early part of the trial, a tendency that quickly went away in the subsequent trials. 
While the tendency to fixate the central cue was reduced in the subsequent trials, older 
adults continued to be delayed in fixating the sudden-onset compared to younger adults. 
Interestingly, in the no-conflict trials, older adults showed a very similar pattern, despite 
the central cue being blank on those trials, while younger adults were relatively 
unperturbed. On endo, conflict trials, older adults exhibited very strong distractibility by 
fixating the exo distractor, which persisted throughout the trial and was also present in 
the subsequent trials. Younger adults, by contrast, showed modest distractibility in the 
updating trial, which was quickly resolved by trial 2. Together, the fixation patterns 
suggest both early and late components of distractibility contribute to the observed 
updating effects, and give some indication that the age differences may be more sensitive 
to the later components.  
Taken together, the results give some indication that older adults have an 
increased tendency to adopt an updating state. However, the relative weakness of the 
effects in the trials extending beyond the immediate post-interruption suggest that the 
story may be more nuanced. With a really strong tendency to update, one might expect 
that older adults would never return to baseline performance (as determined by the 
control groups/blocks), but we see that they clearly do, but just a bit more gradually than 
the younger adults. Similarly, the eye tracking results show dramatic age difference in the 
immediate post-interruption with persisting, but subtle effects in the subsequent trials. 
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While we believe that the paradigm is successful in promoting updating and maintenance 
states, one weakness is that we do not have a clear indicator of when updating occurs in 
all but a few trials following the interruptions. It may be that older adults are in an 
updating state much more frequently, but as we can only capture this through RTs or 
fixations, if we do not have the appropriate control conditions for comparison, they are 
difficult to see. In Experiment 2, there’s some indication that the manipulation was not 
successful, and we do not have a control group as in Experiment 1 that only experienced 
one task. On the other hand, making the between-subjects comparisons in Experiment 1 
carries its own difficulties as well. To complement these findings, one would need a 
paradigm where endogenously-driven (not experimentally-driven) attempts to update can 
be easily captured. The ideal scenario would be an index of updating that could be 
captured using neuroimaging, which does not rely on overt behavior. While there are 
theories regarding specific neural structures involved (O’Reilly, 2006), this is very 
difficult to capture at the slow time resolution of fMRI, and with the poor spatial 
resolution of EEG. Again, it will require careful experimental design to find a reliable 
measure.  
Bridge 
In this study, we examined updating as enforced by the task itself, namely, the 
interruption trials. This, coupled with the fact that participants performed single-task 
blocks, provided a relatively sharp distinction between the updating and maintenance 
states, as discussed above and reported in Mayr et al. (2014). Next, we want to examine 
updating as it occurs in a more natural context, and thus we need an overt measure to 
capture this updating. In Chapter III, we use a paradigm that has enforced updates, but 
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between them we can index updating though fixations towards irrelevant, peripheral cues. 
This allows us to examine how updating may occur both in response to, and 
independently from the task context.  
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CHAPTER III 
TRACKING THE DYNAMICS OF EXOGENOUSLY AND ENDOGENOUSLY-
DRIVEN UPDATING 
 
Introduction 
 In a given day, our behavior may require close attention to our surroundings, or it 
may require strict focus in the face of competing distractions. For instance, while 
navigating a crowded square in an unfamiliar foreign country, one may need to pay 
attention to the landmarks and crowds of people around them in order to find their 
destination. Conversely, while working on a time-sensitive project at work, one may need 
to filter out the conversations of surrounding co-workers and focus on the task at hand. 
Notably, the appropriateness of being either open to one’s environment or filtering it out 
to focus on a goal is context-specific; there is no “right” way of operating across all 
scenarios.  Experimentally we can observe similar effects in paradigms such as the Stroop 
or Eriksen flanker tasks (Stroop, 1935; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), where one must focus 
attention on a particular feature or spatial location and act according to instructed goals, 
often suppressing the urge to perform a more automatic task (e.g., reading the word in the 
Stroop task). This ability to suppress more prepotent actions in the service of an 
instructed goal is a central aspect of executive control, and given the higher-order nature 
of this construct, deficits in executive control can lead to wide-ranging dysfunction. In 
older age, we see an apparent decline in tasks that require focused attention, as well as an 
array of other functions (Kausler, 1991; Salthouse, 1991; but see Verhaeghen, 2011), 
leading some to posit that with older age comes a specific breakdown of executive 
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control. Task switching has also been used as a hallmark measure of executive control, 
but unlike the Stroop and flanker, requires more flexibility in behavior, frequently in 
response to rapidly-changing and unpredictable cues. By contrasting performance on 
task-switch versus task-repeat trials, the switch cost provides an index of the high-level 
processes responsible for re-configuring the current task set (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). 
Surprisingly, in spite the robustness of switch costs and the clear age-related decrements 
in executive control as measured through Stroop-like tasks, some have found relatively 
spared performance in switch costs in older age (Mayr, Kliegl, & Krampe, 1996; Mayr, 
2001; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000). Upon closer inspection, the story is not so 
contradictory, and substantial age differences do emerge when comparing performance 
between longer periods where task switches are expected to occur or not (Mayr, 2001; 
Spieler, Mayr, & Lagrone, 2006). So-called “global costs” compare performance between 
single-task blocks and the no-switch trials in mixed blocks. This indexes the cost 
associated with being in a task switching context, even when the current trial itself does 
not involve a switch. Importantly, these dissociations underscore a more general way of 
interpreting performance on executive control tasks—on one hand, it involves responses 
to local changes that occur in the moment (for instance, whether the task just switched or 
repeated), but it is also dictated by the expectations of the global task context (e.g., being 
in a single versus mixed-task block). This framing converges well with other work 
suggesting that the brain switches between different broad processing “modes” which 
influence how readily information from the external environment is processed (O’Reilly, 
2006; Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). There are different 
theories regarding the exact mechanism, but the commonality is that there are two broad 
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modes, one characterized by a focused state where the currently-relevant representations 
are well-protected from the influences of the outside environment, and another flexible 
state that is biased towards taking in information from the environment and updating 
those representations (hereafter called the “maintenance” and “updating” modes, 
respectively; O’Reilly, 2006). Importantly, as mentioned above, general stability or 
flexibility can be adaptive for different types of scenarios, as purely focused behavior 
would be too rigid, and purely flexible behavior would be too distractible. Recently, it 
has been proposed that the deficits observed in older age are a product of older adults 
being chronically “stuck” in this latter updating state (Lindenberger & Mayr, 2014). This 
bias towards updating essentially makes older adults more reliant on the external 
environment—a strategy that can be adaptive in some circumstances (particularly when 
one’s ability to maintain internal representations is compromised; Gazzaley, 2013), but 
can be detrimental particularly in tasks that require selective attention. This also explains 
why others have found that older adults are prone to focus on information present in the 
environment even when it’s completely irrelevant (Spieler et al., 2006; Rogers, Hertzog, 
& Fisk, 2000). Across studies, there is evidence suggesting that older adults are indeed 
“chronic updaters”, but there has been little work examining this question directly. 
Further, the few cases where it has been examined have focused on a relatively broad 
level—for instance the transitions going from a mixed to a single-task block (e.g., Spieler 
et al., 2006). To our knowledge, no one has explicitly examined the properties of a task 
context that drive transitions between the maintenance and updating states at a fine-
grained level (but see Mayr, Kuhns, & Hubbard, 2014), and the extent to which such 
transitions are endogenously- or exogenously-driven. Accordingly, in the present work, 
 54 
we sought to identify the antecedents to the updating state in a complex task-switching 
scenario, and how such antecedents may differ across age groups. There are several 
possibilities regarding what drives these transitions, and age differences may be 
manifested at any one of them. First, there are local properties of the task that would be 
expected to induce a switch towards updating within a given trial, or in a subsequent one. 
This includes conflict (at the attentional selection or response selection phases), errors 
(both current-trial errors and trials after errors; Dutilh, Forstmann, Vandekerckhov, & 
Wagenmakers, 2013; Ratcliff, Thapar, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004; Starns & Ratcliff, 
2010) or task difficulty. As suggested in the aging literature, there are also properties of 
the global context that may lead to increased adoption of one mode or another (e.g., 
single-task versus task-switch blocks).  From the previous work, we would expect that 
these global influences will be particularly sensitive to age differences in updating (Mayr, 
2001; Spieler et al., 2006; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000). There is also the possibility that 
these transitions are (at least partly) endogenously-driven, occurring independent of the 
task context. One way this may be manifested is a passive carry-over phenomenon, such 
that cue fixations on one trial will be highly predictive of cue fixations on the next, 
independent of any task factors. Previous work has shown that such carry-over models of 
high-level control can explain different effects in the domain of task switching (Mayr, 
Kuhns, & Reiter, 2013; Kikumoto, Hubbard, & Mayr, 2015) and conflict adaptation 
(Hubbard, Kuhns, & Mayr, 2016).  
In order to examine these questions, we need a reliable indicator of being in an 
updating state, and importantly, we want to measure cases where such updates are not 
necessarily required by the task itself. Otherwise we are effectively measuring 
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participants’ adherence to the task rules. With this in mind, we used a modification of the 
paradigm used in Spieler et al. (2006) where task switches were infrequent and thus most 
of the time the current task was unambiguous. This minimized any external task demands 
requiring an updating state. As updating is defined as an increased reliance on the 
external environment, we then used eye tracking in order to track the extent to which 
participants focused on information presented on-screen. We did this with the use of 
distant task cues that were always present, but only informative at very particular, well-
defined points. Any fixations to these cues that occurred on different trials were 
deliberate and, given the unambiguous task context, unnecessary. For these reasons, we 
regarded these redundant cue fixations as an indicator of being in an updating state. We 
then examined the local, global, and endogenous factors that were predictive of these 
fixations, both within and across age groups. Experiment 1 used a similar cueing 
procedure used in Spieler et al. (2006) combined with an attentional capture paradigm 
used previously to examine updating effects in task switching (Mayr, et al., 2014). This 
was performed by a group of undergraduate students, and examined both task-level 
(local) and block-level (global) effects that influenced updating. This paradigm primarily 
involves conflict in directing attention to different spatial locations, in some cases 
broadening the attentional window. This in itself could have led to task-specific effects 
influencing cue fixations. Therefore, in Experiment 2 we used an identical cueing 
procedure, but coupled with a task that involved focusing on the center of the screen, 
with a response-selection demand as seen in previous interference tasks (e.g., Stroop 
flanker). Therefore, cue fixations could not be explained in terms of the task demands. 
We used a variation of the Stroop paradigm which requires a manual, rather than verbal 
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response to color words presented in different colored “inks” (for reviews, see Lu & 
Proctor, 1995 and MacLeod, 1991). Experiment 2 served as a replication, as well as the 
addition of an age-comparative sample to specifically examine the hypothesis that older 
adults update more frequently and identify the factors that give rise to this increased 
updating. To preview, we found that participants exhibited a sizeable number of 
unnecessary cue fixations in both experiments (indicative of updating), and that some 
local task factors (e.g., conflict) triggered updating in younger adults, while carrying little 
influence in older adults. Conversely, in line with previous work (Lindenberger & Mayr, 
2014; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000), older adults were largely driven by the global task 
context, as well as more endogenously-driven “inertia” from updating in previous trials. 
Importantly, unnecessary cue fixations were associated with worse performance on 
subsequent trials, suggesting that they were not merely a strategy to increase accuracy on 
the task. Overall, results were indeed consistent with the notion that older adults are 
“chronic updaters” and also provides a more complete picture regarding the dynamics of 
how and why shifts in broad control states occur.    
 
Methods 
Subjects 
In Experiment 1, n = 31 students from the University of Oregon participated for course 
credit. Experiment 2 included a total of n = 34 University of Oregon students and an age-
comparative sample of n = 31 seniors from the surrounding community in Eugene, OR. 
Seniors were compensated $15/hour for their time.  
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Overall Procedure 
Both experiments involved the same basic structure, but differed in the particular 
tasks used. Each was based on a variable-runs task-switching paradigm (e.g., Altman & 
Gray, 2002), where the currently-relevant task was indicated by peripheral cues at the 
upper corners of the screen. Figure 1 depicts the basic cueing procedure used across both 
experiments.  
 
 
Figure 1. Basic cueing procedure used across both experiments. The currently-relevant 
task is indicated by the small dot that appears in either the left or right circle. The current 
task is highlighted here for illustration. Note cues are not to scale.   
 
Each cue consisted of a word (CENTER/SURROUND for Experiment 1, 
COLOR/WORD for Experiment 2) underneath a small circle. A small dot appeared in the 
center of the circle corresponding to the currently-relevant task. Task switches were 
signaled by an auditory cue (500 hz beep) that indicated that a 50% probability of a task 
switch.  Due to their size and location, participants had to fixate the cues on these “beep 
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trials” in order to know the current task. Each block began with a beep trial to indicate the 
starting task, and beeps occurred in either 1 out of 8 (p = 12.5%) or 1 out of 12 (p = 
8.33%) trials. Task switches could only occur on beep trials, and thus the currently-
relevant task should be unambiguous on intervening trials. A central focus of the analysis 
is on the occurrence of unnecessary cue fixations on these intervening trials. Each 
experiment began with a short practice block involving task switches, followed by two 
single-task blocks (which contained beeps, but participants were informed that the task 
would never change), then mixed blocks (14 blocks of 80 trials in Experiment 1, 10 
blocks of 80 trials in Experiment 2) followed by two more single-task blocks.  
 
Eye Tracking 
Eye movements were measured using the SR Research desk-mounted Eyelink 
1000, controlled by the Eyelink Toolbox in MATLAB (Cornelissen, Peters, & Palmer, 
2002) at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz. Fixations were recorded when neither a blink nor a 
saccade was present, and saccades were defined for each pair of successive data samples 
for which the velocity of eyes exceeded 30°/s or the acceleration surpassed 8,000 
°/s2.   Calibration for eye position registration occurred after the end of practice blocks 
and repeated every 2 blocks. 
 
Paradigm – Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, participants completed a modified version of a paradigm 
reported previously (Mayr et al., 2014) to examine the influences of long term memory 
traces and updating on task-switch effects.  The paradigm consists of two tasks, where 
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participants made speeded responses to a letter (L or R) that appeared either within one of 
six stimulus circles indicated by the central cue (endogenous attention task) or within a 
peripheral, sudden-onset stimulus (exogenous attention task; see Figure 2). The 
endogenous (hereafter, “endo”) task required processing the symbolic central cue in order 
to direct attention to the appropriate location, while the exogenous (hereafter, “exo”) task 
required more bottom-up attention towards the sudden onset (Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, 
& Irwin, 1998), which contained the relevant stimulus. Conflict was generated on 50% of 
trails by presenting not only the currently relevant cue/stimulus (e.g., the central cue), but 
also the currently irrelevant cue/stimulus (e.g., the sudden onset). On each trial, the target 
stimulus (as indicated by the central cue, or the sudden-onset) contained an L or R, 
indicating the participant should press the left or right arrow key, respectively. The 
currently-relevant task was signaled via peripheral cues as discussed above and would 
only switch on half of the rare “beep trials”. For participants, the endo and exo tasks were 
named the “center” and “surround” task, respectively.  
 
Stimuli – Experiment 1  
 Figure 2 presents the basic stimulus setup for Experiment 1.  Participants were 
seated 65 cm from the computer display. Six circular stimulus frames (diameter of each 
circle = 21 mm = 1.9 degrees) were presented along a virtual circle (radius = 75 mm = 6 
degrees) around the screen's center.  These circles where always presented in white on a 
black background.  Within each circle the "&" symbol or the letters L or R could be 
presented in white, size 14 Helvetica font.  An additional, sudden-onset circle of the same 
size could appear between two of the regular circle positions (90 mm = 7.25 degrees from 
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center).  This circle was always presented in red and could also contain the letters L or R 
in white, size 14 Helvetica font.  At the center of the screen there were six smaller cue 
circles (diameter of each circle= 7 mm = 0.6 degrees).  These were arranged in a way that 
mirrored the larger set of 6 stimulus circles (radius of the central cue circle= 12 mm = 1.1 
degrees), such that for each position in the larger stimulus circle, there was a 
corresponding, smaller cue circle.   The smaller cue circles could be presented either in 
white or red. 
The stimulus display also contained two task cues in the upper left and the upper 
right corners (27 degrees from screen center). The task cues consisted of a verbal task 
label (CENTER or SURROUND, size 14 Helvetica font) along with a small circle 
(diameter = 9 mm = 0.8 degrees).  During inter-trial-interval (ITI), both of these circles 
were filled with small dots.  With stimulus onset, the dot remained in the center of the 
relevant-task circle, while the irrelevant-task circle was empty.  This ensured that cues 
were uninformative during the ITI, and that the relevant cue would not be a sudden-onset 
stimulus, which would draw attention in an automatic manner (Theeuwes, et al., 1998). 
Because the dot was small, it was necessary to fixate the task cues in order to identify the 
current task on beep trials. Since task switches could only occur on beep trials, it should 
be unnecessary to fixate cues on other trials.  
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Figure 2. Stimuli and timing used in Experiment 1. Participants either focused on the 
central cue (Endogenous task) or red sudden-onset (Exogenous task). For illustration, the 
current target is highlighted here by a dotted line.  
 
Procedure – Experiment 1 
Each trial began with a 1000 ms ITI in which all of the large peripheral circles 
contained the “&” symbol and the central cue circles were all filled in red (Figure 2).  In 
the endo task, at stimulus onset all central cue circles turned white except for a single one 
that remained red. This red circle indicated which of the corresponding peripheral circles 
contained the correct response-relevant stimulus (L or R).  In the exo task, the response-
relevant stimulus was embedded in the single red sudden-onset circle that appeared 
between the peripheral circles. Conflict was manipulated by presenting stimuli for the 
irrelevant task on 50% of trials. Thus, for the endo task, on conflict trials a red sudden-
onset stimulus appeared (Figure 2).  For the exo task, on conflict trials a central cue was 
presented (i.e., one of the central cue circles remained red) while on the no-conflict trials, 
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all cue circles turned white. Additionally, on each trial all non-target circles also 
contained L’s and R’s in order to maximize the need to fixate the appropriate stimulus. 
Stimuli remained on screen until a response was made. Error feedback was given in the 
form of a red flash of the screen for 200 ms, while on correct trials, the circles were filled 
with the “&” symbol for this period.   
 Participants performed one 40-trial practice block followed by 14 test blocks with 
80 trials each. Depending on the between-subject condition there was either a .085 or a 
.125 probability of a “beep trial”.  On beep trials, a 500 Hz tone at the beginning of the 
ITI indicated there was a p=.5 probability of a change in task, thus prompting participants 
to inspect the task cues in the upper corner of the screen.  For “non-beep trials”, 
participants were instructed that the task always remained the same as on the previous 
trial and cue-inspections were not necessary.  Twelve participants were exposed to a .085 
rate of beep trials, and 16 participants to a .125 rate.  This factor interacted in no 
systematic way with the effects of interest and therefore will be ignored for the analyses. 
 
Paradigm – Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 was a variant of the Stroop paradigm with a manual response 
(MacLeod, 1991; Lu & Proctor, 1995). On each trial a color word was presented in either 
a matching color (e.g., RED in red “ink”) or a mismatching color (RED in blue ink; see 
Figure 3). This word was flanked on the left and right by two squares, each presented in a 
particular color. These squares served as response cues—participants were required to 
press either the left or right arrow keys to indicate the correct response color. As in the 
typical Stroop paradigm, conflict/incongruent trials where defined as those where the 
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word did not match the ink color. In these trials, one square always matched the color 
corresponding to the word, and the other square corresponded to the ink color. On no-
conflict trials, where the word matched the ink color, one square corresponded to that 
color, and the other was a random color chosen from the remaining set of colors. In order 
to reduce the possibility of direct stimulus repetitions across subsequent trials (Mayr, 
Awh, Laurey, 2003), this paradigm used a set of 8 colors (red, green, blue, yellow, 
orange, purple, pink, and brown). Conflict was present on 50% of trials. As in 
Experiment 1, the currently-relevant task was indicated by peripheral cues (COLOR or 
WORD) using the variable-runs task-switching procedure discussed above.   
 
 
Figure 3. Stimulus Sequence for Experiment 2.   
 
Procedure – Experiment 2 
 Each trial began with an 800 ms ITI in which the two response squares were filled 
with white, and four X’s were displayed in place of the central word. During this time, 
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both peripheral cue circles were also filled small X’s. At stimulus onset, one of the 8 
color words appeared in the center of the screen (size 40 Helvetica font), the response 
squares (width = 3.14 degrees, 6.28 degrees from center) were filled with the 
corresponding colors, and a dot appeared in the center of the currently-relevant peripheral 
cue. Stimuli remained on screen until a response (left or right arrow key) was made. For 
correct responses, the chosen square was enlarged by 20% for 200ms. For errors, the 
word changed to four white X’s, and the response squares turned white and large black 
X’s in the center of each for 200ms. Participants first completed a short 20-trial practice 
block (which included beeps and switches), followed by two 80-trial single-task blocks 
(one for the color task, one for word, counter-balanced), then 10 mixed blocks (80 trials 
each), and two more single-task blocks. For Experiment 2, beeps occurred at a rate of 
12.5% (1 out of 8 trials). On these trials, the beep occurred in the last 200ms of the ITI, 
just before stimulus onset. In addition to undergraduate students at the University of 
Oregon, Experiment 2 also has an age-comparative sample of seniors (age 65-80) 
recruited from the surrounding community in Eugene, OR.  
 
Results 
Out of the 31 participants in Experiment 1, three were excluded due to corrupted 
eye tracking data, leaving a total of 28 for the analysis. Of the 34 younger adults who 
participated in Experiment 2, two were excluded due to corrupted eye tracking data, two 
were excluded for failing to finish the experiment, and two were excluded for failing to 
follow task instructions (i.e., fixated the cues on less than 25% of beep trials). From the 
31 seniors in Experiment 2, two were excluded for having error rates in excess of 40%, 
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and one was excluded for failing to finish the experiment. This left a total of 28 for 
analysis in each age group for Experiment 2. 
 
Basic RT Effects 
 In Experiment 1 the exo task is much easier to perform than the endo task, by 
design (Mayr et al., 2014). The mean RTs for each task, conflict condition, and block 
type (single vs. mixed) are depicted in Figure 4. These were analyzed using linear mixed-
effects modelling using the lme4 package in R (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), 
with the factors Task (1=endo, 0=exo) and Conflict (1=conflict), and a separate model for 
single and mixed blocks. In these and subsequent analyses, we excluded error trials, trials 
after errors, beep trials, trials after beeps, the first trial of each block, and very slow 
responses (RTs > 4000ms). As expected, the endo task had much slower RTs in both 
block types (bSingle = 202, t = 6.67; bMixed = 176, t = 13.07), and showed a greater conflict 
effect (bSingle = 116, t = 8.75; bMixed = 91, t = 8.80). We also observed a conflict effect for 
the exo task selectively in the mixed block (b = 31, t = 2.11).  
 
 
 66 
 
Figure 4. Mean RTs for Experiment 1. Error bars indicate within-subject standard error 
(Cousineu, 2005).   
 
Figure 5 depicts the RTs for Experiment 2 for each task, conflict, and block 
condition, as well as each age group. These were analyzed using linear mixed-effects 
models in the same manner as in Experiment 1. While there is an expected overall 
increase in RT in the older adults, there was also an unexpected difference by task, such 
that the younger adults responded more quickly for the color task (consistent with 
previous findings in similar manual Stroop tasks, Lu & Proctor, 1995) while older adults 
showed the reverse effect, responding more quickly for the word task (Age x Task 
interaction, bSingle = -339, t  = -4.83; bMixed = -201, t  = -4.17). Previous work 
demonstrating a reverse Stroop effect in older adults is lacking, thus more work is needed 
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to establish whether this differential sensitivity to the tasks can be replicated. As we are 
focusing predominantly on the cue fixation effects, this difference has no consequence 
for most of the analyses performed here, except when examining the influence of task 
difficulty, since the more difficult task was different for each age group (word for young, 
color for old). However, we found that task difficulty nor task itself had an effect on cue 
fixations in Experiment 2, and thus the remaining analyses we disregarded task.  
 
 
Figure 5. Mean RTs for Experiment 2. Error bars indicate within-subject standard errors 
computed within each age group (Cousineau, 2005).  
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Global Effects 
 As a first step, we examined the amount of unnecessary cue fixations as a result of 
the global task context. Previous work has shown that more global aspects of the task (for 
instance, comparing single-task and task-switch blocks) can be dissociable from more 
local task demands (switch costs), and that the former is more sensitive to age differences 
(Mayr et al., 1996; Mayr, 2001; Kray & Lindenberger, 2000).  This previous work 
compared performance between a single-task and a task-switch contexts and found that 
older adults showed greater global costs. This is presumably a consequence of an over-
reliance on set-updating, which is particularly costly for single-task blocks (c.f., Mayr, 
2001). Note that in the mixed blocks, younger adults are also expected to adopt more of 
an updating mode in order to deal with the task switches, but in a manner that is closely 
tailored to the probability of switching (c.f. Mayr, Kuhns, & Rieter, 2013). Furthermore, 
younger adults should revert to a stable, maintenance state in the single-task blocks while 
older adults will be less prone to do so (Spieler et al., 2006). Thus we would expect more 
cue fixations in older adults overall, plus a greater increase of fixations in the mixed 
compared to single-task blocks. Accordingly, for both experiments we used repeated-
measures ANOVA to compare the proportion of unnecessary cue fixations between the 
mixed and single-task blocks, and in Experiment 2 also tested for an interaction with age 
group. Note that Experiment 1 had a between-subjects factor that manipulated the 
occurrence of the beep trials (either 1 out of 8 or 1 out of 12 trials), but we found that this 
factor had no significant influence on cue fixations across tasks or block types (p > .37), 
and thus ignored it in subsequent analyses. Figure 6 shows the mean proportion of cue 
fixations by task and block type in each experiment. As evident in Figure 6, there were 
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indeed more cue fixations in the mixed blocks in Experiment 1, F(1,27) = 4.84, p < .05, 
ges = .07. In Experiment 2, both age groups show increased cue fixations on mixed 
relative to single-task blocks F(1,54) = 20.9,  p < .001, ges = .10, and as predicted, older 
adults showed a much greater increase in the mixed blocks F(1,54) = 8.84, p < .001, ges 
= .044. Notably, these are cue fixations that do not occur on the beep trials, so it cannot 
simply be explained by participants following the instructions, and it cannot be explained 
by the presence of the beeps themselves, as the single task blocks included them as well 
(but were completely irrelevant). Thus the mixed blocks were successful in inducing an 
updating state in both groups and across both experiments, but as expected, older adults 
were disproportionately sensitive to this change.   
 
 
Figure 6. Mean cue fixations by block type for Experiment 1 (left) as well as age group 
for Experiment 2 (right).  
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 Another way we can approach the question of whether older adults are more 
sensitive to the global effects is by examining (on a qualitative level) the number of cue 
fixations in mixed blocks as a function of the number of cue fixations in single-task 
blocks. This has been used in the aging literature in the past to reveal the extent to which 
older adults show deficits in particular cognitive processes, above and beyond simple 
slowing (i.e., state-trace analysis; Mayr et al. 1996; Verhaeghen, 2011). For each 
individual in Experiment 2, we calculated the proportion of cue fixations in the single-
task and mixed blocks, and plotted them in relation to each other in Figure 7 (i.e., single-
task blocks on the x axis and mixed blocks on the y axis). If there were some common 
process that affected the amount of cue fixations on single and mixed blocks equally, 
then we would expect most data points (individuals) to cluster around the diagonal. 
Similarly, if this process were similar across age groups, then we would see both age 
groups cluster around the same area of the plot. If, however, there is something unique 
about the mixed condition, then we would expect the points to cluster above the diagonal, 
and if this process were different across age groups, the younger and older adults would 
cluster in different places. As is evident in Figure 7, younger adults show a fairly tight 
clustering around the diagonal within a relatively restricted range on both block types, 
while older adults show much more variability, and a greater range in the mixed block. 
This suggests that, for older adults, there is something unique about the mixed condition 
that cannot be explained by some common process that affects cue fixations in general. 
Conversely, for younger adults there appears to be a more consistent process that affects 
the increase in cue fixations in the mixed blocks.   
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Figure 7. Cue fixations for mixed blocks as a function of single task blocks for all 
participants in Experiment 2.  
 
Local Effects 
 Clearly being in a task-switching context has some influence on the tendency to 
update overall. Next we take a closer look within the mixed blocks and examine the 
aspects of the local task environment that influence updating in the moment. Possible 
factors include the task conditions themselves (conflict, task difficulty), one’s behavior in 
the current trial (committing errors), as well as adjustments following particular trial 
types (trials after conflict, trials after errors). While there was a clear expectation of age 
differences in the global effects, here we did not have a strong a priori expectation 
regarding specific local effects that may differ across age groups. In order to examine 
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these effects at a finer level, we examined each effect using a logistic mixed effects 
model with current-trial cue fixation (coded 0 or 1) as the dependent variable, and the 
effect of interest (e.g., Conflict, Error) coded as a binary predictor. All models included a 
random intercept for each subject and a random slope for the effect of interest. We 
excluded beep trials, trials after beeps, and trials with RTs greater than 4000 ms and, 
except where errors were the effect of interest, error trials and trials following errors. We 
also excluded trials that followed a cue-fixation trial; as described later, we found that 
cue fixations tended to happen in streaks, and thus we wanted to capture the initial 
transition towards an updating state, not the carryover from the previous trial. The same 
analysis routine was applied to both Experiments 1 and 2, with two exceptions: 1) Due to 
the dramatic task differences in tasks in Experiment 1 (by design), all models also 
controlled for task using a main effect (coded exo=1, endo=0) and 2) As Experiment 2 
included an age-comparative sample, age group (coded 0 for young, 1 for seniors) was 
included in each models as well as the interaction with the effect of interest.  
The estimates and p values for all models of local task effects are depicted in 
Table 1. For Experiment 2, we include the coefficient for the Age x Effect interaction as 
well. Note there was also a very robust main effect of age, with older adults exhibiting 
more cue fixations than young. Since all models had the same dependent variable, the 
estimate was similar across them (1.46-1.76; all p’s <.001) and thus was not included in 
the table. Similarly, the main effect for Task in Experiment 1 was highly significant and 
similar across models (.49-.52; all p’s <.001). In both experiments, we see there is an 
effect of current-trial conflict, such that people are more likely to fixate the cues on 
conflict trials (although it was marginally significant in Experiment 1; Table 1).  For 
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trials following conflict trials, we see a reduced tendency to fixate the cues, but only for 
Experiment 2. Furthermore, this interacted with Age, indicating this tendency was greatly 
reduced in older adults. For trials following errors, there was an increased tendency to 
fixate the cues in both experiments (Table 1), which again interacted with age in 
Experiment 2, showing a reduced tendency in older adults. For Experiment 1, we see a 
decreased tendency to fixate the cues on the harder task (the endo task). However, there 
are two plausible interpretations of this effect. The fact that the exo task was easier could 
have allowed the control system to be “lazy”, leading to a loss of the task set, and a need 
to update more often. Alternatively, cue fixations could have been prompted by the 
spatial distribution of attention in the exo task, which necessitated a broadening of the 
attentional window, compared to focusing on the central cue in the endo task. Part of the 
motivation for Experiment 2 was to present all task-relevant stimuli at the center, so that 
we could examine the effect of task difficulty in particular. We can see in Table 1 that 
there is no hint of a difficulty effect in Experiment 2. This suggests that the broadening of 
the attentional window is more likely to have prompted more fixations in Experiment 1. 
Note that for Experiment 2, the Difficulty factor was coded according to age group (i.e., 
color task for young adults, word task for older adults). As a follow-up we also ran a 
model using a Task factor (without recoding), but there again was no effect (all p’s > 
.30).  Together the results suggest that for young adults, current-trial conflict can induce 
an updating state. In Experiment 2, it appears that younger adults are much less likely to 
update following these trials, suggesting some type of conflict-triggered adjustment. 
After committing errors, younger adults are also more likely to update, suggesting a loss 
of task set leading to the error, and a subsequent cue fixation to regain it. In both these 
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cases, older adults are less likely to make these adjustments (since the coefficients are in 
the opposite direction in each case). This suggests that older adults do not respond as 
readily to these factors.  
 
Table 1. Summaries of Mixed Effects Models for Local Task Factors 
 
Coefficients and p values are for the effects of interest. Each model for Experiment 1 
included a predictor for Task (1= exo task, 0= endo task) not depicted here, with a 
coefficient that ranged between .49 and .52. Likewise, all models for Experiment 2 
included a main effect of Age, with a coefficient between 1.46 and 1.76.  
 
Endogenous Effects 
 In addition to the results above suggesting that unnecessary updating is induced 
by particular events in the task context (e.g., conflict, errors), we also wanted to examine 
the extent to which endogenous factors that operate independently of task context may 
influence updating. For instance, it is possible that a control state on one trial which leads 
to a cue fixation has a certain amount of “inertia” that increases the likelihood of fixating 
the cue on the next trial. This notion that executive control states can carry over across 
successive trials has been demonstrated in previous work in the domain of task switching 
(Mayr, et al. 2013; Kikumoto et al., 2016) and conflict adaptation (Hubbard et al., 2016). 
Thus we examined the extent to which fixating the cue on one trial (indicative of an 
Effect p Effect p Effect		x	Age p
Conflict 0.32 0.06 0.31 0.01 -0.25 0.1
Lag-Conflict -0.02 0.84 -0.45 0.02 0.26 0.05
Error -0.06 0.85 -0.28 0.19 0.38 0.12
Lag-Error 1.53 <.001 2.17 <.001 -1.25 <.001
Difficulty -0.52 <.01 0.04 0.81 0.02 0.9
Experiment	1 Experiment	2
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updating state) influenced cue fixations on the next trial, regardless of the particular task 
context. First we examine this on a purely descriptive level, by seeing how often cue 
fixations occur relative to the last beep trial, where such fixations were necessary. If there 
is some kind of carry-over, then we would expect that a cue fixation prompted on a beep 
trial may increase the likelihood of fixating the cues (i.e., updating) unnecessarily on 
subsequent trials. Figure 7 shows the mean proportion of unnecessary cue fixations for 
successive trials after the last beep trial, separately for single and mixed blocks and (in 
Experiment 2) age groups. These exclude error trials, trials after errors, and slow 
responses (RTs > 4000 ms). In this figure, there appears to be a high tendency to fixate 
the cues on immediate post-beep trials, which declines gradually in subsequent trials. 
Note that this effect appears to be more dramatic for the older adults in Experiment 2, 
who also show a greater difference between mixed and single blocks (as established in 
the global analyses above).  
 
 
Figure 8. Proportion of cue fixations following beep trials. Unfilled points denote older 
participants in Experiment 2.  
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As a next step, we want to determine whether this carry-over effect also translates 
to unnecessary updating as well, and whether this tendency may be increased in older 
age. This is difficult to determine from the plots alone, as it is clear that the beep trials do 
seem to have an influence on subsequent trials. Similar to the local effects, we used 
multilevel logistic regression to examine current-trial unnecessary cue fixations as a 
function of whether the cue was fixated on the previous trial. To capture the carryover 
effect from unnecessary cue fixations in particular, we controlled for whether the current 
trial followed a beep trial (where the cue fixations were necessary), as well as the number 
of trials since the last beep. We begin with the mixed blocks only. This analysis showed a 
strong effect of previous-trial cue fixations influencing current-trial fixations in both 
experiments (bExp1 = 1.67, z = 7.69, p < .001; bExp2 = .69, z = 2.47, p < .05), an effect that 
also interacted with age in Experiment 2 (b = .78, z = 2.22, p < .05). This was on top of 
the increased (although non-significant) tendency to fixate the cue on immediate post-
beep trials (p’s > .20), and the tendency for cue fixations to gradually decrease on trials 
further away from the beep (bExp1 = -.02, z = 2.30, p < .05; bExp2 = -.04, z = 3.35, p < 
.001). These latter two effects did not interact with age in Experiment 2, however (all p’s 
> .20). Figure 9 illustrates the age interaction from Experiment 2 by showing the model 
predictions from the analysis above. We can see that, following trials with no cue 
fixations, there is little age difference in the tendency to fixate the cue on the current trial, 
while after cue-fixation trials, we see a much greater tendency in older adults. In order to 
see whether this inertial effect interacts with the global context, we repeated the above 
analyses, but including both block types, and an additional predictor coding for the mixed 
block (1=mixed, 0=single). In these models we found similar effects as before, but with a 
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negative interaction between the block type and the carry-over effect (bExp1 = -1.33, z = 
7.76, p < .001; bExp2 = -.80, z = 5.04, p < .001), but no further interaction with Age in 
Experiment 2 (p = .45). This indicates that with the mixed task context comes a decreased 
carry-over effect from updating in the previous trial. Given the relatively few fixations in 
these blocks (Figure 9) and the simpler task context, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
inertial effect would carry more influence in these blocks. It is surprising, however, that 
this does not differ with age, given the overall age differences by global context (Figure 
6). Thus across both experiments and age groups, we see that cue fixations (i.e., 
updating) tend to happen in streaks, where updating on one trial increases the likelihood 
of updating on the next, an effect that is increased in older adults. This occurs both in 
response to necessary updating imposed by the experiment, but also in terms of 
unnecessary updates. This suggests that being in an updating state does not always obey 
the boundaries of the trial structure imposed by the experimenter.  
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Figure 9. Model predictions examining the carry-over effect in Experiment 2. This 
analysis was performed on the mixed blocks only. Error bars indicate confidence 
intervals from the logistic mixed-effects model.  
 
 
Behavioral Consequences of Cue Fixations 
 While the findings above suggest that certain global, local, and endogenous 
factors influence the tendency to update, we must also consider the possibility that these 
cue fixations (despite being unnecessary) may be a deliberative and strategic part of 
doing the task. Perhaps fixating the cues is just a conscientious method of remaining on-
task, and this tendency is increased on older adults. In fact, there is a consensus in the 
aging literature suggesting that older adults work to avoid errors to a much stronger 
degree than younger adults (e.g., Starns & Ratcliff, 2010), as well as an increase in 
0
10
20
30
40
no yes
previous trial cue fixation
cu
rre
nt
 tr
ial
 cu
e 
fix
at
ion
 (%
)
young
old
 79 
conscientiousness across the lifespan. If this is indeed the case, then cue fixations should 
be tied to improved performance in some way. Thus fixating the cue on trial n may lead 
to faster responding and better accuracy on trial n+1, and perhaps better accuracy on trial 
n as well. If, however, cue fixations are an indicator of updating inappropriately, then we 
would expect unchanged or even worse performance on the next trial. Accordingly, we 
examined the behavioral consequences of fixating the cues both within the current trial 
and in the next trial using linear mixed effects models (again, within the mixed blocks 
only). First we examined the effect on response time (RT) on trials immediately 
following cue-fixation trials. Importantly we exclude beep trials as well as trials where 
the cue was fixated, since these trials are almost guaranteed to have longer RTs, and we 
control for Task and Conflict, as they show clear RT differences as well (Figures 4 and 
5). If fixating the cue leads to a refreshing of the task set that leads to more effective 
processing on the next trial, then we would expect faster responses following cue-fixation 
trials.  However, across both experiments we see exactly the opposite, where fixating the 
cue on the previous trial leads to slower responses on the following trial (bExp1 = 53, t = 
3.51; bExp2 = 87, t = 3.93). This result is much more in line with a model of passive carry-
over of the control state between trials (Mayr et al., 2013; Kikumoto et al., 2016; 
Hubbard, et al., 2016). This finding aligns well with the results of the cue fixations, 
which appear to happen in streaks, but importantly this analysis excludes any trials where 
a cue fixation occurs, suggesting that performance still suffers following a string of cue-
fixation trials. This, however, seems to be a general effect that does not interact with age 
(t = 1.14), so there is no evidence that it provides any additional costs or benefits to older 
adults. Again, this goes against the explanation that increased cue fixations in older adults 
 80 
arise from those participants being more conscientious. Additionally, there is no evidence 
that cue fixations influence error rates in the current (as reported above) and subsequent 
trials (all p’s > .21). 
 
Confirmatory Cue Fixations 
 In the analyses above, we index an updating state through unnecessary cue 
fixations. What we have not examined thus far is how attention is directed during this 
state. We have shown in previous work that updating is not necessarily characterized by 
undirected distraction, but that attention is biased towards specific task-relevant features 
(Mayr, Kuhns, & Hubbard, 2014). In the present context, we can look not only at cue 
fixations, but which cue is fixated. Since the relevant task was unambiguous non-beep 
trials, and the location of each task cue (COLOR/WORD or CENTER/SURROUND) was 
fixed on each block, we can distinguish cases where participants fixate the task-relevant 
cue, from cases where they fixate the irrelevant cue. If the updating state is associated 
with general distraction, or a complete loss in the task set, then we would not expect any 
systematic bias towards either cue. Accordingly, among all the cue-fixation trials, for 
each participant we calculated the proportion of those that went towards the relevant 
versus irrelevant cue, and examined the difference using logistic mixed-effects models 
with a binary predictor coding for task-relevant cues (1=relevant, 0=irrelevant). Note that 
this is specifically addressing the question, given a cue fixation, which cue is fixated? 
This is different from asking how many fixations occur towards one item or another, 
compared to all other trials. Given the task differences in cue fixations in Experiment, we 
also included the main effect and interaction with Task (coded 1=exo, 0=endo). This 
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yielded a significant Task x cue-relevance interaction (b = 1.80, z = 2.14, p = .032). As 
evident in the model predictions in Figure 10, we see a bias towards the relevant cue, but 
only in the exo task. The endo task shows a numerical, but non-significant bias. This 
model was repeated for Experiment 2, which included an interaction with Task as well as 
Age. This model yielded a highly significant bias towards the relevant cue (b = .52, t = 
8.49), but no interactions with Task or Age (all t’s < 1.50). Figure 11 depicts the model 
predictions separately for each age group, but for simplicity does not separate by task. 
We see that for both age groups, there is a considerable bias towards the task-relevant 
cue, to a similar degree as the exo task in Experiment 1.  
 
 
 
Figure 10. Proportions of relevant versus irrelevant cue fixations for Experiment 1. 
Values are model predictions from a logistic mixed-effects model. Error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 11. Proportion of relevant versus irrelevant cue fixations in Experiment 2. Values 
are model predictions from a logistic mixed-effects model including an interaction with 
Task and Age, but plotted disregarding task. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
Discussion 
 In the present investigation, we sought to characterize the factors that influence 
shifts in global control states in a complex task-switching scenario. Previous work has 
posited the existence of at least two broad processing states—one stable maintenance 
state, characterized by robust maintenance of task-relevant information and another 
flexible updating state that brings in new information in the environment. Recent work 
has also suggested that many age differences observed across many tasks may be 
attributed to a chronic updating state—in other words, a greater reliance on information 
in the environment, even when that information is redundant (Rogers et al., 2000). This 
idea has been put forward in terms of the broad strokes, but with relatively little empirical 
work directly testing the assertion. The main drive of the present work was to establish 
the antecedents that lead to shifts towards the updating state, and to characterize where 
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age differences emerge. In the process, we also illuminated some of the dynamics of 
these shifts.  
Specifically, we used fixations towards the peripheral cues in an unambiguous 
task context as an index of an updating state, and focused on three potential levels that 
may drive them: 1) global shifts in task context (i.e., mixed versus single-task blocks) 2) 
local task factors that change on a trial-by-trial basis (e.g., conflict, errors) and 3) 
endogenous factors, which may operate independently of the specific context (i.e., 
passive carry-over). Broadly, we found in both experiments that updating in younger 
adults was driven largely by the local task effects, particularly following conflict trials 
and error trials. This suggests a more transient process that is triggered by rapid shifts in 
the task. This was in addition to endogenous factors that drove cue fixations, namely, 
passive carryover from one trial to the next. Thus updating on one trial increased the 
likelihood of updating on the next, a pattern that is in line with previous work in task 
switching and conflict adaptation (Kikumoto et al., 2016; Hubbard et al., 2016). Older 
adults showed a somewhat different pattern, being much less likely to update in response 
to the local task demands, but an increased tendency to update based on the global 
context (i.e., the difference between single and mixed-task blocks). Older adults also 
showed an increased tendency towards passive carry-over across trials. The global effects 
are indeed consistent with the chronic updating account of aging, with older adults being 
more environment-bound (Spieler, et al., 2006; Lindenberger & Mayr, 2014). The result 
that older adults have an increased tendency towards passive carryover is more difficult 
to interpret. This pattern could emerge simply as a consequence of older adults being in 
the updating state more often, not necessarily a result of the “inertia” of the control state 
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carrying over across successive trials. The latter interpretation would suggest that not 
only are older adults more likely to update, but that regardless of what state they are in, 
those states are “sticky” and resistant to rapid change. It is also possible that similar 
effects do indeed drive younger and older adults towards an updating state, but that the 
threshold is much lower for older adults. Thus, the reduced local effects are a 
consequence of the older adults being triggered into the updating state more easily, and 
thus less of a sharp contrast between trial types (e.g., conflict and no-conflict). This 
would also lead to longer streaks of cue fixations in the older adults. Yet another 
possibility is a general tendency towards broader temporal construal in older adults. It is 
possible that the older adults are more concerned with the long-term aspects of the task, 
which in this case would coincide with mixed versus single-task blocks, and are simply 
less attentive to the faster moment-to-moment changes at the level of individual trials. 
Ideally, these possibilities could be explored in a paradigm in a more continuous task that 
does not have such abrupt changes between trials (c.f., Esterman, Noonan, Rosenberg, & 
DeGutis, 2012) which would allow one to distinguish shifts in the updating state that are 
not necessarily bound by the task structure. This would also allow one to impose gradual 
long and short-term shifts in the task context to specifically test the temporal construal 
explanation.  
 
Are cue fixations really an index of updating?  
 Here we treat unnecessary cue fixations as a signal that executive control system 
is in an updating state, one that is biased towards refreshing information from the 
environment. Others may interpret these fixations as simple double-checking, a deliberate 
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act seeking to confirm information that the participant already has access to. In fact, 
analysis of the cue fixations indicates that participants in both age groups are more likely 
to fixate the relevant task cue. This suggests that the cue fixations really are unnecessary. 
Previous work in aging has also shown us that older adults are in general more 
conscientious (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006), and have an exaggerated 
tendency to avoid errors in laboratory tasks (Starns & Ratcliff, 2010; Ratcliff et al., 
2004).  Thus cue fixations could just be strategic attempts to avoid errors. Importantly, in 
both experiments we examined the consequences of updating, to rule out the notion that it 
was a sort of speed-accuracy tradeoff that led to better performance. If anything, the 
results were more consistent with a poorly-optimized control state that led to poorer 
performance (in terms of RTs), which carried over into the next trial (Kikumoto et al., 
2016; Hubbard et al., 2016; Mayr et al., 2013). These effects speak against a simple 
speed-accuracy tradeoff. However, given that the cue fixations were not predictive of 
subsequent errors indicates that there was little cost to the older adults for making these 
eye movements, beyond a slowdown in response time. This leaves open the possibility 
that the cue fixations did not help performance significantly, but gave the older 
participants the sense that they were avoiding errors. Since error rates were not affected 
one way or another, this is difficult to address in the present investigation. Some may also 
suggest that cue fixations are more an indicator or monitoring or vigilance, rather than the 
specific attempt to update. The fact that the eye movements indicate knowledge of the 
task are in line with this explanation, as is the relatively small cost associated with the 
cue fixations. Notably, this pattern also converges with literature on reading behavior, 
which shows that in many ways the eyes follow predictable patterns that operate 
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independently of the intentions of the reader (e.g., Engbert, Nuthmann, Richter, & Kliegl, 
2005). This suggests that there is some underlying process responsible for planning eye 
movements and sampling from the environment that is not necessarily under volitional 
control. The findings here could reflect a similar process, which samples information 
from the task cues even though the participant herself may know exactly what they need 
to do. If this is indeed the case, the question is whether this kind of sampling occurs as a 
result of a global updating state, or operates completely independently. It is possible that 
this more automatic sampling may reflect an attempt to update, but without actually 
updating the internal representations, something more akin to monitoring. It is possible 
that the cue fixations observed here may be a mixture of this automatic process and more 
deliberate updates, making it difficult the disentangle the influence of each.  
Whether the cue fixations are driven by voluntary updating or a more automatic 
process is still and outstanding question. At the broadest level, updating can be seen as 
simply an attempt to gather information from the environment—whether this is driven by 
a high-level intention to confirm information or a low-level process out of voluntary 
control is still yet to be determined. In either case, it does not change the pattern that 
older adults do it more—the question then focuses on how well older adults can 
overcome that tendency when asked. So far, the evidence suggests that as long as 
information is in the environment, older adults have difficulty avoiding it, but can 
nonetheless perform well when that information is absent (e.g., Spieler et al., 2006). This 
suggests a more automatic process, but does not necessarily rule out strategic effects 
either. Again, the pattern could be attributed to monitoring or vigilance instead of 
updating per se. These questions cannot be answered in the present investigation since 
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cues were present on all trials, and we cannot compare performance in the presence or 
absence of cues. A thorough examination of this question will take careful task design, 
and would most likely require some measure of updating from neuroimaging. This would 
allow one to identify updating in a manner independent of overt behavior, and thus 
speaks against intentional, strategic factors. To our knowledge, however, such an index 
has yet been discovered using human neuroimaging.  
 
Possible neural mechanisms 
 Previous computational and experimental work established a strong case that 
these broad processing states do exist, with most accounts attributing them to the 
dopamine or noradrenergic systems. Computational modeling of working memory first 
introduced the idea that the cognitive system switches between a protected state, which 
can be updated with the opening of a gate that allows in information from the 
environment (O’Reilly, 2006). These states are largely driven by dopamine-mediated 
interactions between the prefrontal cortex and the basal ganglia. Coming from work in 
animal models, other theoretical work has suggested that the relative dominance of 
different classes of dopamine receptors can lead to “D1” or “D2” states, that are 
characterized by stability and flexibility, respectively (Durstewitz & Seamans, 2008). 
They suggest that this will drive differences both within and across individuals. Others 
have suggested that tonic activity in the locus coeruleus norepinephrine (LC-NE) system 
can drive the brain towards a flexible “exploration” state, while phasic bursts within that 
system can lead to a focused “exploitation” state through an adaptive gain mechanism 
(Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). This account conveniently has the added benefit that the 
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LC-NE system can be indexed via fluctuations in pupil diameter (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 
2005; Nieuwenhuis & Jepma, 2011). For instance, others have found that changes in 
tonic pupil diameter can predict exploratory choices in a n-armed bandit task (Jepma & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Gilzenrat et al., 2010). We examined pupil diameter in the present 
task and found a general pattern of increased pupil diameter in trials approaching cue 
fixation trials, but these effects were weak and difficult to interpret due to the rapid nature 
of the tasks, which were not optimized for pupillometry (which is has a sluggish response 
of ~ 1 second). We do not have strong opinions about which particular neural mechanism 
gives rise to these states, and indeed it has been suggested that the dopaminergic and 
noradrenergic systems may activate each other’s receptors (Sara, 2009). The age-related 
bias towards updating, and the evidence that dopamine may play a role converges well 
with evidence that the dopamine system is systematically depleted with older age 
(Bäckman et al., 2006). Thus with increasing age the downregulation of dopamine may 
tip overall brain dynamics towards an updating state. Again, to provide strong support for 
this account, one would need a reliable neural index of updating to distinguish it from 
more strategic factors.  
Bridge 
In Chapters II and III, we examined how updating occurs through examination of 
RT costs in relation to task events (e.g., following interruptions), and fixations towards 
relevant versus irrelevant items on-screen (e.g., peripheral cues). These, however, are 
indirect measures of what we actually want to capture, which is the actual representation 
of the task context. Thus in Chapter IV, we developed a paradigm similar to that in 
Chapter II and in previous work in our lab, but tailored to electroencephalography (EEG), 
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a measure of electrical activity in the brain. By using these measurements combined with 
machine-learning techniques, we attempt to extract abstract information about the task 
context as it emerges in time. As a first step, this needs to be done in a very controlled 
context, without the additional manipulations associated with updating (e.g., 
interruptions). By first establishing that the information can be extracted, in future work 
we can extend it to more directly address questions regarding the updating and 
maintenance states.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DECODING THE DYAMICS OF ABSTRACT ATTENTIONAL  
SETTINGS IN TASK SWITCHING 
 
This work was co-designed with Atsushi Kikumoto, who also provided technical 
background regarding EEG data collection and analysis and will be a co-author on the 
paper. The main text below (but not the extended methods) is co-authored with Ulrich 
Mayr. 
 
Since Wilhelm Wundt, it has been an important, though somewhat elusive goal to 
trace the cascade of information processing in humans.  We show that all relevant 
representations within a task-switching situation—of stimuli, responses, and even 
abstract attentional settings—can be extracted with high temporal resolution from scalp 
electrophysiological signals (EEG). Importantly, with this method, we can characterize 
the temporal dynamics of abstract attentional settings, and probe their relevance for fluent 
performance.   
Existing methods to infer mental processing components, such as chronometric 
analyses of response-time (RT) patterns, the analysis of Evoked EEG components 
(ERPs), or fMRI BOLD signal, provide only limited information about when and how 
specific representations are used in the service of goal-directed action.  Also, these 
techniques are of limited value when trying to explain performance on the level of 
individual trials—either because they rely on differences between conditions, or because 
of the level of inherent noise. Moreover, it is of particular theoretical importance to 
characterize the dynamic behavior of those abstract representations that control “lower-
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level” stimulus or response-related codes. Yet, because such codes are not tied to specific 
stimuli or responses, they are particularly difficult to pin down with existing methods.   
 We used a standard task-switching paradigm (see Figures 1A and 4).  On each 
trial, participants (1) encoded an auditory task cue (with two possible cues per task) in 
order to (2) establish one of two possible task sets (color vs. orientation), which then are 
used to (3) localize the task-relevant object among a set of eight objects, (4) ignoring the 
currently irrelevant object, and (5) translate the response-related stimulus feature (e.g., a 
specific color) into an actual response (e.g., left versus right key). Via a linear classifier, 
we examined to what degree the spatial power distribution in four bands of the EEG 
frequency spectrum (i.e., delta: 2-3Hz, theta: 4-7Hz, alpha: 8-12Hz, beta: 13-31Hz) 
expressed information about each of these five aspects, using trial-by-trial and 
millisecond-by-millisecond data.   
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Figure 1. Timeline of task sequence and decoding results. Dotted lines indicate cue (-300 
ms) and stimulus onset (0 ms) in all three panels. A. Stimulus sequence with each to-be-
decoded task element is highlighted. B. Timeline of competing models, one with serial 
progression from the attentional set to stimulus and response processing (I), and a 
simultaneous model of high-level and low-level representations (II). C. Decoding 
accuracy of each task element across time, normalized to the same chance level. 
 
Previous work has shown that the locus of spatial attention and working memory 
can be decoded from the EEG signal1.  However, so far we know little about how the 
time course with which locations of task-relevant (target) and task-irrelevant (distractor) 
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information can be distinguished.  Eye-tracking based estimates from task-switching 
experiments have indicated a surprisingly long (about 300 ms) initial period of 
indifference between target and distractor information2.  Further, we are particularly 
interested in the degree to which we can decode abstract attentional-set representations, 
and if so, how these representations behave relative to lower-level codes that represent 
cues, stimuli, or responses.  For example, according to one prominent model, people may 
not actually rely on abstract attentional/task settings, but instead use conjunctions of cue 
and stimulus representations to resolve ambiguity between competing tasks3. A further, 
unresolved question is to what degree attentional sets are activated prior to lower-level 
processes in order to tune these towards goal-relevant information, or whether they are 
activated in parallel with lower-level representations, “molding” goal-relevant processing 
as it occurs (see Figure 1B).   
Figure 1C shows how decoding accuracy unfolds for the different stimulus 
aspects.  The auditory task cues are represented only initially, but become much less 
important once the stimulus appears—a result that is inconsistent with the cue-stimulus 
conjunction model3.  In contrast, in line with the notion that the cue is used to retrieve the 
attentional setting4, decoding of the attentional set (task) begins during the prestimulus 
period.  Decoding of the attention set increases once the stimulus appears and remains 
strong throughout the post-stimulus period.  In additional analyses, we verified that 
decoding of the attentional set generalized across features/responses, thus ensuring the 
abstract nature of the represented information (Figure 6).  In parallel to the attentional set 
we can also decode the target position, and to a lesser degree of the distractor position—
both peaking between 200 and 300 ms. Strikingly, the difference between target and 
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distractor location emerged much earlier than the approximately 300 ms time point 
suggested by previous eye-tracking evidence2.  In parallel with target processing, 
decoding of the feature value and/or response code (which cannot be dissociated in the 
current desing, but see SM) ramps up and peaks near 500 ms.    
Decoding was performed on a trial-by-trial manner. Therefore, we can use an 
additional output, the posterior probability, as an indicator of the classifier confidence to 
examine to what degree RT variability is explained by lower-level codes (i.e., 
target/distractor position or feature/response), or by the more abstract, attentional-set 
representation (see SM for more detail).  As shown in Figure 2A, beyond decoding 
accuracy of the target position and of the feature/response, the attentional set serves as a 
powerful predictor: The more strongly it is expressed on a given trial, the faster the RT.  
Figure 3 also demonstrates the strength of the relationship between the decodability of 
the different codes and performance (slow vs. fast RTs), but also how switching of 
attentional sets affects representations. Specifically, the attentional set representation was 
weakened, but not delayed on switch trials.   
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Figure 2. Relating trial-by-trial classifier confidence for each element to reaction time 
(A), and to task-related evidence (B). Lines denote estimates from mixed-effects models, 
repeated for each task element and time point. Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals 
around the estimates.  
 
As indicated in Figure 1C, the task representation can be decoded in the 
prestimulus phase, suggesting some degree of pre-stimulus preparation over and above 
the representation of the superficial task cue.  However, most of the predictive power 
arises only after the stimulus is presented, and in parallel with the other lower-level 
codes. This suggests that the attentional setting promotes simultaneous, task-specific 
processing.  In fact, when examining relationships between decodability of the task and 
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the lower-level features (Figure 2B), we see that in the post-stimulus phase, task-set 
decodability is initially related to target position decodability, after which also a 
relationship with feature/response decodability emerges.  While this evidence allows no 
conclusions about causal direction, it is consistent with the view that attentional sets mold 
simultaneous lower-level processing in a goal-appropriate manner.   
 
 
Figure 3. Average classifier confidence over time, separated by fast vs. slow RTs 
(determined via median split) and switch vs. no-switch trials. Task elements are separated 
into three panels for clarity. Bands indicate within-subject confidence intervals calculated 
at each time point and fast/slow condition. Notably, most elements show a fast/slow 
difference, and task evidence selectively shows a switch effect in slow trials.   
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 Using data-driven, EEG decoding analyses we clarified the temporal dynamics of 
both lower-level stimulus/response codes and abstract, attentional settings.  We found 
that processing of task-relevant stimulus information emerged much earlier than 
suggested by previous research.  We also found that the strength of the abstract 
attentional set representation (rather than of superficial cue information) promotes fluent 
performance, and that it seems to do so by shaping simultaneously active, lower-level 
representations.  We believe that these, and related methods have enormous potential for 
uncovering the temporal dynamics of hidden representations.  
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Extended Methods 
 
 
 
Participants 
 A total of n = 22 participants from the surrounding community in Eugene, OR 
participated in this experiment. They were compensated at a rate of $10 per hour, with 
additional incentives based on performance on the task (explained below).  
 
Procedure 
The basic stimulus procedure followed a cued task switching paradigm (Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995) and followed the general setup of paradigms we have used previously 
with eye tracking (Mayr, Kuhns, & Reiter, 2013; Kikumoto, Hubbard, & Mayr, 2015). 
On each trial, an auditory cue indicated which of 2 tasks the participant had to complete, 
and upon stimulus onset, participants had to covertly attend to a unique stimulus among 
an array. The array consisted of 8 circular gratings (diameter of each ~ 2.4 degrees) in a 
larger circular arrangement (diameter ~ 12.5 degrees). Most of the stimuli were vertical, 
black and white gratings that should always be ignored. Each task involved attending to 
an item in the array that differed on a single dimension. For the Color task, one needed to 
pay attention to the only colored (vertical) grating, which could be two different shades 
of reddish-orange. For the Orientation task, one attended to the black and white grating 
that was tilted 30 degrees either to the left or right. Participants then made a speeded 
response using a left or right key on the keyboard (“z” and “?”, respectively) depending 
on the unique item that was presented. For the Color task, if the item was in the more 
yellow color, they pressed the left (z) key, and if it was the redder color they pressed the 
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right (?) key.  For the Orientation task, if it was tilted to the left, they pressed the left (z) 
key, and if it was tilted to the right they pressed the right (?) key. Both potentially task-
relevant items were present on every trial, so it was crucial to pay attention to the cue 
before stimulus onset. It has been previously established that a substantial portion of task-
switch costs can be attributed to cue switches instead of task switches per se (Mayr, 
2006). One way to eliminate this possibility is to pair each task with two different cues 
and alternate those cues across trials, resulting in cue switches on every trial. 
Accordingly, each task was paired with two auditory cues: “color” or “hue” for the Color 
task, and “tilt” or “lean” for the Orientation task. The audio files were generated from the 
built-in text-to-speech in Mac OS X 10.10, then edited so that their duration was exactly 
300 ms.  
 The stimulus sequence is depicted in Figure 4. Each trial began with a 700 ms 
prestimulus interval with a fixation cross in the center of the screen. The auditory cue was 
presented in the last 300 ms of this interval, so the stimulus array appeared as soon as the 
cue completed. On every trial, the stimulus array consisted of 6 vertical black-and-white 
gratings, one colored vertical grating (either reddish or yellowish), and one tilted black-
and-white grating (tilted 30 degrees to the left or right). Participants were seated 
approximately 70 cm from the screen, and instructed to keep their eyes at fixation and not 
blink throughout the trial; trials containing eye movements were detected via 
electrooculogram (EOG) and excluded from the analysis. This is important, as eye 
movements and blinks contribute considerable noise to the EEG signal. Thus any ability 
to detect a signal relating to the stimulus position is a result of covert attention and not 
something to do with the eye movements. After identifying the correct item, participants 
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responded using the index finger of their left or right hand. They were instructed to 
respond as quickly and accurately as possible. The stimuli remained on screen until a 
response was made. If they made a mistake, an error tone was emitted for 100 ms. Lastly, 
there was a jittered inter-trial interval (ITI) between 750 and 937 ms, where participants 
were allowed to blink before the next trial began. The experiment began with 2 practice 
single-task blocks of 20 trials each (one for each task, order counter-balanced), followed 
by a practice block containing task switches, then 22 blocks of 64 trials each. In order to 
incentivize them to respond quickly and accurately, they were rewarded a small amount 
(0.5 cents) for each trial where they were faster than the 75% percentile of their previous 
RT distribution, but only if they maintained at least 90% accuracy for a given block. At 
the end of each block they were given feedback regarding their average RT and accuracy 
for that block. The RT distribution was determined separately for each task and switch 
condition after the first mixed-task block, and updated with each trial. Task switches 
occurred on 50% of trials, and the location of the cued item (target) and irrelevant item 
(distractor) was randomly determined on each trial, with the constraint that they occurred 
along the different parts of the array with roughly equal frequency. Since putting this 
constraint on the 8 unique positions would result in too many conditions to balance, the 
array was broken into 4 bins (2 positions per bin) and targets and distractors were 
constrained to occupy each bin with roughly equal frequency. The particular stimulus for 
each task (e.g., left-tilt or right-tilt for the Orientation task) was randomly determined on 
each trial. 
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Figure 4. Trial sequence. After a jittered ITI and 400ms fixation, an auditory cue 
indicated the task (the speaker image was not presented), followed immediately by the 
stimulus onset. Every trial contained both a target-relevant and irrelevant stimulus. 
 
EEG Recording and Preprocessing 
Electroencephalographic (EEG) activity was recorded from 20 tin electrodes held 
in place by an elastic cap (Electrocap International) using the International 10/20 system. 
The 10/20 sites F3, Fz, F4, T3, C3, CZ, C4, T4, P3, PZ, P4, T5, T6, O1, and O2 were 
used along with five nonstandard sites: OL midway between T5 and O1; OR midway 
between T6 and O2; PO3 midway between P3 and OL; PO4 midway between P4 and 
OR; and POz midway between PO3 and PO4. The left-mastoid was used as reference for 
all recording sites. Data were re-referenced off-line to the average of all scalp electrodes. 
Electrodes placed ~1cm to the left and right of the external canthi of each eye recorded 
horizontal electrooculogram (EOG) to measure horizontal saccades. To detect blinks, 
vertical EOG was recorded from an electrode placed beneath the left eye and reference to 
the left mastoid. The EEG and EOG were amplified with an SA Instrumentation amplifier 
with a bandpass filter of 0.01–80 Hz and were digitized at 250 Hz in LabView 6.1 
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running on a PC. Preprocessing was performed using the Signal Processing and 
EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) toolboxes in MATLAB. Trials including blinks 
(>80uv, window size = 200 ms, window step = 50ms), large eye movements (>1°, 
window size = 200 ms, window step = 10ms), and blocking of signals (range = -0.0 5uv 
to 0.05uv, window size = 200 ms) within the interval of -700 to +400 ms relative to the 
stimulus were rejected and excluded from further analysis, resulting in an average of 180 
trials (12.4%) rejected across participants. 
 
Results 
Behavior 
 Of the 22 participants who participated in the experiment, one was excluded for 
having EEG artifacts in excess of 30% of trials, and one was excluded due to an 
experimenter error that resulted in data loss, leaving a total of n = 20 for analysis. For all 
analyses reported, we first excluded practice trials, error trials (3.8% across participants), 
trials after errors, and trials that were rejected based on the criteria in the EEG 
preprocessing (e.g., blinks, artifacts, eye movements, explained above). We then 
submitted the RTs to a repeated-measures ANOVA with factors Task (coded Color = 1, 
Orientation = 0) and Switch. This yielded a modest, but highly significant switch effect 
(Mno-switch = 634 ms, Mswitch = 659 ms; F(1,19) = 40.7, p < .001), but no effect of Task, 
(F(1,19) = .03, p = .86), and only a marginal Task x Switch interaction, F(1,19) = 3.33, p  
= .08. The small magnitude of the switch effect is unsurprising, given the relatively long 
response-stimulus interval (RSI) that ranged between 1450 and 1637 ms. Having such a 
long interval is known to reduce (but does not eliminate) the switch effect (c.f., Mayr et 
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al., 2013). In designing the paradigm, this fact had to be balanced with the constraint that 
participants needed sufficient time to blink between trials.  
 
EEG analysis 
After initial preprocessing and identification of artifacts, the single-trial EEG data 
were decomposed into a time-frequency representation via wavelet decomposition. The 
power spectrum of EEG signal was obtained from fast Fourier transform, which was then 
convolved with the power spectrum of complex Morlet wavelets, defined by ei2πtf e-t2/ 
(2*σ2) where t is time, f is frequency, and σ is the width of each frequency band, set 
according to n/2πf where n increased logarithmically from 3 to 8. This was repeated for 
the frequency bands between 2 and 31 Hz in logarithmically-spaced steps. The 
incremental number of wavelet cycles was used to balance between both temporally-
based and frequency-based precision (Cohen, 2014). Logarithmic scaling of the 
frequency bands was used to keep the width across each band approximately equal. This 
was all performed in the frequency domain, then brought back into the temporal domain 
using inverse Fourier transform. A frequency band-specific estimate at each time point 
was defined as the squared magnitude of the convolved signal Z(real([z(t)]2 + imag[z(t)]2) 
for power, and as arctangent of Z(imag[z(t)] / real([z(t)]) for phase. Only power was 
considered for the present investigation, and for simplicity we focused on frequency 
bands that are most often presented in the literature: delta (2-3 Hz), theta (4-7 Hz), alpha 
(8-12 Hz), and beta (13-31 Hz). For each frequency band, we averaged the power signal 
across the range of interest. 
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Decoding Procedure 
 Performing the wavelet convolution as described above resulted in an estimate of 
power of each frequency band for each of the 20 electrodes across time. For each trial, we 
extracted a window centered around stimulus onset, starting 500 ms before and extending 
500 ms after the onset. The end of this interval corresponds to the 30th percentile of the 
RT distribution, ensuring that at least 70% of trials are still in progress at that point. This 
is important when decoding information towards the end of the interval, where we want 
to capture a substantial portion of the data, not just trials that have exceptionally long 
RTs. Thus we had an estimate of power in a given frequency band (delta/theta/alpha/beta) 
at a particular point in time, for a given trial for each of the 20 electrodes. Previous work 
has established that different types of information are encoded in brain oscillations at 
particular frequency bands (e.g., Buschman et al., 2012; Fries, 2005; Engel, Fries, & 
Singer, 2001; Foster et al., 2016) which motivated decomposing the raw EEG signal into 
the separate bands. However, in the present investigation we were agnostic to which 
bands encode which type of information, and thus concatenated all 4 bands together in 
the decoding analysis. We also repeated the main decoding analysis using simply the raw 
EEG signal across the 20 electrodes at each timepoint, and found the results were 
generally similar, but (as expected) noisier.  
We were, however, interested in the evolution of the information in time, and 
accordingly performed the analyses separately for each timepoint. Thus in the decoding 
analyses, the features consisted of the estimate of power for each electrode at a single 
point in time, repeated for each frequency band (20 electrodes x 1 timepoint x 4 bands = 
80 features). Prior to decoding, the EEG data were z-scored so that the mean of each 
 105 
trial’s data was 0. Thus we examined the extent to which the spatial pattern of the EEG 
power across the scalp (across the 4 frequency bands) was predictive of each task feature. 
As discussed in the main text, the features we considered were the auditory cue 
(“color”/”hue” or “tilt”/”lean”), the task (Color or Orientation), the target position 
(partitioned into 4 bins, coded 1-4), the distractor position (bins 1-4), and the response 
(left vs. right). Note that in the current paradigm, we cannot distinguish between the 
manual response and the unique task stimulus (e.g., left-tilted grating, or reddish grating) 
as they were completely confounded. Additionally, as we wanted to isolate the 
discriminability of each feature regardless of any task differences, for each feature, we 
performed the decoding separately within each task (except, of course, in decoding the 
task itself). The results from these analyses were then averaged. In both EEG and fMRI, 
spatial patterns of activation tend to be idiosyncratic across individuals, and thus we 
performed all analyses separately for each subject and averaged the results across the 
group (c.f., Foster et al., 2016). The machine learning algorithm we used was L2-
regularized logistic regression, as implemented in the scikit-learn package in Python 
(Pedregosa et al., 2011), with a tolerance of 1 x 10-4 and the inverse of the regularization 
strength (C) set to 1.0. Note that we repeated the main decoding analyses with naïve 
Bayes, support vector machines, and random forests and the results were consistent 
across the different algorithms. Multi-class classification (which was the case for target 
and distractor positions), was implemented as a series of binary classifications. We used a 
4-fold cross-validation procedure where approximately 75% of trials were used in the 
training set, and the remaining 25% of trials were used as the test set, and this was 
repeated until each trial had an opport
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we report the average decoding accuracy, averaged within subject, timepoint, and factors 
of interest (e.g., task), then across subjects. In addition to the decoding accuracy, we also 
utilized the posterior probabilities generated from the classifier on each trial. Specifically, 
for each item in the test set, the classifier generates a posterior probability (using the 
predict_proba function in scikit-learn) for each class, indicating the classifier’s 
confidence that the test observation belongs to each class. The class with the highest 
posterior thus corresponds to the guess given by the classifier, and the sum of all 
probabilities for a single test observation sum to 1. Thus for each trial, we can obtain a 
continuous measure of the classifier confidence that a certain feature (e.g., task, target 
position) is a particular value (color task, position 4), and this can be repeated for each 
feature of interest. Importantly, we always retained the posterior associated with the 
correct answer, regardless of whether the classifier guessed correctly or not. We used 
these posteriors in two ways in order to relate them to participants’ performance on the 
task. First, we averaged them in a similar manner as the classification accuracy, but 
within factors that were related to performance but unknown to the classifier (e.g., switch 
trials, or fast responses, Figure 3). Secondly, we used these trial-by-trial indicators of 
classifier confidence as predictors in linear mixed-effects models in order to predict 
response time (RT) across trials, described in more detail below.  
 
Prediction Analyses 
 In the first phase of the analysis, we examine the extent to which we can recover 
information about the task context from the pattern of the EEG power spectra. In the 
prediction analyses, we utilize the posterior probabilities (classifier confidence) from the 
 107 
first phase and examine the extent to which the information recovered is predictive of 
trial-by-trial performance on the task. Importantly, when training the classifier, we give 
no information other the the labels of the factor being decoded 
(cue/task/target/distractor/response). While the decoding accuracy alone is persuasive, 
particularly when considering the emergence of difference pieces of information across 
time, it is still difficult to interpret exactly what is recovered from the EEG signal. A 
more convincing case is made if that information then relates to performance on the task 
itself, or distinguishes between different trial types unknown to the classifier. This 
suggests that we are capturing something about the extent to which participants are 
representing the given task feature. Accordingly, after performing the decoding analyses 
as discussed above, we retained the posterior probabilities for each trial as it is included 
in the test set. This is repeated for each feature of interest: cue, task, target position, 
distractor position, and response. Specifically, we retained the probability associated with 
the correct class, regardless of the guess from the classifier. Thus we include both 
probabilities where the classifier had high confidence and got the answer correct, as well 
as trials where the classifier had low confidence in the correct answer (i.e., 
misclassifications). This provides a relatively unbiased method of examining the extent to 
which the information recovered via the decoding analysis relates to task performance; if 
the classifier is incorrect on a particular trial, it may be because the participant did not 
have a robust representation of the task context, which would then lead to reduced 
performance (i.e., slow RTs). If the classifier confidence is related to some contingency 
in the task itself and not the participants’ representation of the context, then it is not likely 
to relate to performance in a systematic manner. The probabilities for each of the 5 task 
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features for each trial were first logit transformed, since they were not normally 
distributed, then used as predictors in linear mixed-effects models predicting RT, with a 
random intercept and random slopes for each predictor (unless otherwise noted) for each 
subject.  These analyses were carried out using the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 
2014). This procedure was performed on a timepoint-by-timepoint level, where a separate 
model was fit at each time, as well as a trial-by-trial analysis, with posteriors averaged 
across time for each trial. In the former case, the implicit assumption is that the different 
task factors can be represented simultaneously, and we are thus accounting for the unique 
contributions of each towards predicting the outcome (e.g., RT). In the latter case, we 
instead acknowledge that information emerges at different stages across the trial, and 
perhaps the strength of each one (at the appropriate point in time) predicts the behavioral 
outcome. For this analysis, we look at the group-averaged decoding results, and for each 
feature find the timepoint with the maximum decoding accuracy. We then choose a 150 
ms window centered around that point, and average the (logit-transformed) posteriors 
across that window, separately for each feature. We also used this same general 
procedure to examine the extent that the different pieces of information are related to 
each other (Figures 2B and 8), again using linear mixed-effects models, but using the 
posteriors for one feature (e.g., task) to predict another (e.g., target position).  
 
Decoding Results 
 
 As described in the main text, we examined the extent to which information for 
each task feature is represented across time. To observe this emergence across time, we 
decoded the task feature at each individual timepoint, thus the results at any given point 
are independent from the adjacent timepoints. From our previous work using eye tracking 
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in similar paradigms (Mayr et al., 2013; Kikumoto et al., 2015), we expected that there 
would be timing differences in the processing of the Color versus Orientation task. 
Generally, color is processed more rapidly than most other features. This was confirmed 
in exploratory analyses showing a more rapid deployment of attention to the color target 
compared to the orientation target. Given these task differences, we did not want the 
classifier to pick up on contingencies that were based on the task alone. Similarly, when 
decoding the cue, which has 4 possible values, looking at decoding accuracy alone makes 
it difficult to distinguish how much the classifier is picking up on between- versus within-
task contingencies. Accordingly, for all features except for task itself, we preformed 
decoding separately within each task. Thus the solution that was fit in the training set 
could not be due to task differences. For Figure 1, we then simply averaged the decoding 
accuracy across both tasks. For each feature, we confirmed that there were no substantial 
differences, where there was a complete absence of information for one task. Thus all 
features had a 50% chance rate, except for the location of the target/distractor. For the 
target/distractor location, we decoded the position based on the bin that each item 
appeared in (with 2 unique positions per bin). Since the task was designed such that the 
target and distractor bins were balanced, this ensured that the target and distractor 
occupied each combination of bins with equal frequency (including sharing the same 
bin). This way, we can rule out the contention that successful distractor decoding may be 
due to the classifier actually decoding “not target position”. Thus chance accuracy for the 
target and distractor is 25%, and in Figure 1 in the main text, these are simply shifted up 
so that chance level is the same as the other features.  
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As evident in Figure 1C, the decoding accuracy for each feature follows what we 
would expect in the information processing stream. Just after the cue onset at -300 ms, 
we see increased decoding accuracy for the cue. Since the cue itself is only informative in 
its relation to the task set, we would not expect such information to persist for an 
extended time, and in the decoding accuracy, we see that it greatly reduced by stimulus 
onset and completely absent by 400 ms. At a similar time, we see a ramping up for 
information for the task, mostly after the cue information as died down. This is expected 
to be a persisting representation that lasts the duration of the trial, and we see that the 
information does indeed stay largely above chance throughout the interval. Right at 
stimulus onset, we see an increase in information towards the target position (bin) that 
peaks around 250 ms post-stimulus, and begins to die down towards the end of the 
interval. We see a similar pattern but with lower overall accuracy for the distractor 
position, which again dies down towards the end of the interval. Lastly, information for 
the response (or stimulus) builds starting around stimulus onset, but doesn’t peak until the 
end of the interval, when information for most other features have begun to decline.  
While the emergence of information across time makes sense, with the decoding 
of the task in particular, this analysis alone cannot rule out the possibility that the 
classifier is not decoding an abstract attentional set, but perhaps lower-level features such 
as the response—for instance, if the color task is easier to attend to, or easier to make the 
decision once the item is attended, then the classifier could simply pick up on this 
contingency and use it as a means of (indirectly) decoding the task. If, however, we are 
indeed picking up on an abstract attentional or task set, then we would expect this 
representation to generalize across the particular (left vs. right) responses. Accordingly, 
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we performed a cross-classification analysis where at each timepoint we trained the 
classifier to distinguish the task on trials that ultimately required a left response, and 
tested the classifier on trials requiring a right response (and vice versa). If the classifier is 
picking up on an abstract representation, then the particular response should not matter, 
and we should still see robust decoding accuracy with the same temporal profile as in 
Figure 1C. As can be seen in Figure 5, when cross-classifying across responses, we get a 
slightly lower, but still above-chance decoding of the task, compared to classifying within 
left/right responses. We also performed the converse analysis, shown in Figure 7—
decoding the response itself (left vs. right) but training on one task, and testing on the 
other task. If we are indeed picking up on a left versus right manual response, then this 
should generalize across the particular task in which it occurs, which appears to be the 
case. Note that in figures 5 and 6 we extend the interval to 700 ms since we are 
specifically examining the generalizability of these representations that occur later in the 
trial, but the pattern does not change drastically after the 500 ms mark.  
 
 
 
 112 
 
 
Figure 5. Cross-classification of task across unique responses. Classifiers were trained to 
distinguish task (Color/Orientation) in left responses, then tested on trials with right 
responses, and vice-versa. For completeness, the within-response classification is also 
displayed.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Cross-classification of response across tasks. Classifiers were trained to 
distinguish response (left/right) in one task, then tested on the other task, and vice-versa. 
The within-task decoding is also shown for completeness.  
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Classifier Confidence by Performance 
 
 In the following analyses, we turn to the posterior probabilities for each task 
feature and each trial, and examine the extent that they are predictive of behavior. As a 
first step, we examine these probabilities in a similar manner as the classification 
accuracy, but no we average the results based on factors that were never given to the 
classifier. We saw in the behavioral results that we have a reliable switch effect, so we 
wanted to see the extent to which each feature was modulated by switch versus no-switch 
trials. It is possible that a change in task will cause a disruption in processing of all task 
features. Alternatively, the behavioral switch effect may only be related to modulations in 
certain task features. Similarly, we also acknowledge that within switch and no-switch 
trials, there will be variability in task performance not necessarily related to the task 
factors (e.g., lapses in attention, mind-wandering, fatigue). These factors may also result 
in a more general perturbation of all task-relevant information, or more specific factors. 
Accordingly, we first did a median split on RTs in each individual, separately within 
switch and no-switch trials. We then averaged the posterior probabilities from the main 
classification analysis separately within each switch and RT condition (i.e., fast vs. slow 
RTs). Note that except for decoding task, classification was performed within tasks 
separately, and thus the classifier had no explicit knowledge of the switch condition or 
the fast vs. slow RTs. Thus any differences in the trial-by-trial confidence in the task 
features should arise from differences in the clarity of information that results from 
performance (e.g., slow responses or switch trials). These results are presented in Figure 
3 in the main text. It reveals that evidence for task, response, and target position are quite 
different between fast and slow trials, while evidence for the task is selectively modulated 
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across switch and no-switch conditions, but only in the slow trials. This pattern of results 
makes sense, suggesting that when one is more on-task, it is associated with a sharper 
(i.e., more easily decodable) representation of the target, the task, and ultimately the 
response. Conversely, being on-task does not necessarily modulate processing of the cue, 
which is not surprising given that the cue comes before stimulus onset and only serves as 
an indicator for the task set. What was surprising was the lack of a difference for the 
distractor position, which we expected might be increased on slow RT and switch trials. 
The relatively low decoding accuracy in the overall results, however, indicate that there is 
relatively little information from the distractor that can be recovered. It should be noted 
that since the posteriors bear some relationship to the decoding accuracy, averaging the 
decoding accuracy in this manner produces very similar results, except they are noisier 
due to the fact that accuracy is binarized instead of continuous.  
 
Predicting Performance from Classifier Confidence 
 As a last step, we wanted to examine the relationship between the classifier 
confidence and performance in a more fine-grained manner. Specifically, we wanted to 
establish the extent to which information about each task element was predictive of the 
ultimate response time on each trial. We did this using the same posterior probabilities 
examined above, but used them as predictors in a linear mixed effects model predicting 
RT. First, RTs were prewhitened by removing any linear or quadratic trends over the 
course of the experiment. Next, as the posterior probabilities are bounded and not 
normally distributed, we logit-transformed them prior to the analysis. In the first step, we 
examined how the representation each task element across time contributes to the 
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ultimate response time. Accordingly, for each timepoint and each task element we ran a 
separate mixed-effects model, using the (logit-transformed) probability of a given task 
element (e.g., task, target position) and the prewhitened RT data as the dependent 
variable. Each model included a random intercept for each participant as well as a 
random slope. The estimates for each task element across time are plotted in Figure 2A in 
the main text. Bands indicate 95% confidence intervals around the estimate. Note that 
since the dependent variable is RT, coefficients going in the negative direction indicate 
better performance. What is most apparent is the prediction associated with the task 
confidence, which shows the largest fluctuation, beginning slowly around cue onset, but 
increasing dramatically after stimulus onset. Given that it goes in the negative direction 
tells us that higher confidence in the task representation is associated with faster 
responses, particularly in the interval around 200-400 ms post-stimulus. Similarly, we see 
a negative-going prediction for the target position and the response, starting to increase 
right after stimulus onset, but peaking a bit later after the task predictability. Similar to 
the results above, the cue carries little predictive power, but if anything, shows a trend 
towards slower responses. This makes sense, as a robust representation of the cue (the 
auditory stimulus) would only hinder task performance after stimulus onset, as one needs 
to translate the cue processing to the actual task set. The most surprising pattern is for 
that of the distractor, which is predictive of shorter RTs. This predictability occurs 
relatively late in the trial compared to the other task elements. Note that in this analysis, 
we ran a separate model for each task element, disregarding the other elements. Since the 
decoding was also carried out in this manner, we felt this was the most appropriate. We 
did, however, perform another analysis including all elements in the same model, 
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assessing the predictability for each, above-and-beyond the influence of the other 
elements, and this model yielded very similar results.  
 As a next step, rather than tracking the evolution across time, we wanted to better 
capture the contribution of each task-relevant element to performance on a trial-by-trial 
level. It is certainly reasonable to assume that different sources of information are more 
robustly maintained at different parts of the trial when they are actively being used—for 
instance, there would be no expectation of response-relevant information until after the 
task and target position have been established. With this in mind, we turned to the 
original decoding analysis, and identified for each task feature the time of maximum 
decodability. We then chose a fixed window of 150 ms centered around this point for 
each element separately, then averaged the (logit-transformed) posterior probabilities 
across this window for each trial. For the response, the maximum decoding accuracy was 
towards the end of the 500 ms interval, so we simply averaged the period from 350-500 
ms. Thus for each trial we had an average probability across a particular window in time 
for each task element. We then used these averaged (logit-transformed) probabilities in a 
single mixed-effects model, with each probability as a predictor, and the prewhitened RT 
as the dependent variable. In this case it was appropriate to include all elements in the 
same model, since we were not making assumptions about them being simultaneously 
represented in time. This model included a random intercept and a random slope for all 
predictors for each participant. The estimates from this model are depicted in Figure 7. 
Note that we see a similar pattern as in Figure 2A, where task seems to carry the most 
influence (and predicting faster responses), followed by the target position and the 
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response. Again, the cue and distractor position carry little predictive power with respect 
to the response time.  
 
 
Figure 7. Performance-related predictability across trials. For each element, the posterior 
probability was averaged over a 150 ms including the point of maximum decodability. 
These average probabilities were included as predictors in a single mixed-effects model 
predicting RT across trials.  Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals around the 
estimates.  
 
 
From the analyses above, it is clear that the extent to which information about the 
task can be decoded from the EEG signal has some relation to performance on the task 
itself. This was also true for the processing of the target position, and for the response. 
This prompts the question of whether what is decoded as “task” may subsume some 
information related to the other two factors. In other words, is it an abstract attentional set 
that arises independently of the lower-level factors, or is there some contingency where 
the lower-level information could masquerade as this abstract set in the decoding 
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analysis? To address this question, we performed similar timepoint-by-timepoint 
regressions as above, but this time using the (logit-transformed) task probability as a 
predictor, and the other factors (e.g., target position, response) as the dependent variables. 
The result gives a timepoint-by-timepoint representation of how strongly each of the 
other factors is related to the task decoding. If the decoding of task is really just related to 
these lower-level factors, then we would see very strong positive relationships in the 
classifier confidences. These results are presented in Figure 2B in the main text, and 
repeated in Figure 8 to also include the distractor-related information. As evident in 
Figure 8, the target position and the response have the highest associations with the task-
related confidence. Importantly, we see that these associations emerge at different points 
in time, with the target position being related to task early in the trial, and the response 
shortly thereafter. It is also notable that these associations are limited to specific windows 
in time—if we were truly decoding the same information across contexts, then we would 
expect strong associations across the entire interval. Notably, in Figure 1C it is clear that 
there is above-chance decoding of task, target, and response before the associations 
between them emerge. We also see a modest positive association with the cue, but only in 
the pretrial interval, which also makes sense. Overall this analysis suggests that there is 
probably some shared information among the attentional set and the lower-level factors, 
as suggested in the simultaneous model discussed in the main text, but we are also 
capturing distinct information from each element. The findings from the cross-
classification analyses also support the notion that we are capturing an abstract set that 
can generalize across particular responses.  
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Figure 8. Associations between the posterior probabilities for each factor and task 
evidence at each timepoint. Bands denote 95% confidence intervals around the estimates.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The present project was aimed at clarifying the fluctuations of executive control 
as they occur within a complex task environment. As discussed above, there is a body of 
evidence suggesting that executive control operates, at least in part, by pushing the 
cognitive system between broad processing states. These states, in turn, influence how 
lower-level systems (attention, memory) operate with respect to their reliance on 
information in the environment (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; O’Reilly, 2006; 
Lindenberger & Mayr, 2014). Specifically, we examine two such modes of processing, 
one which robustly maintains representations independently of environmental influences, 
and another which specifically seeks out information from the environment to update 
those representations. As we discussed, each mode has its strengths and weaknesses 
depending on the task context—focused attention is beneficial when filtering out 
irrelevant information is necessary, but can also lead to overly-rigid behavior. 
Conversely, flexible behavior can be desirable in some contexts, but can lead to 
distractibility.  The contention that older adults are over reliant on the updating mode 
would explain why they suffer on so many focused-attention tasks, but not so much on 
ones requiring flexibility (Kray & Lindenberger, 2000; Linenberger & Mayr, 2014).  
While there is no shortage of work examining executive control in general, there 
is relatively little specifically examining these broad states, and thus the present work 
makes a contribution in this regard. Using paradigms that provide crisp distinctions 
between these modes allowed us to examine how and when switches to the updating state 
occur, and, using age-comparative samples allowed us to determine specifically how age 
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differences are manifested. Chapter II used a paradigm that enforced shifts to 
maintenance and updating modes, and by looking at performance time-locked to the 
forced updates, we saw that older adults seemed to persist in this updating mode for 
several trials. Younger adults also suffered from the updates (as expected), but to a much 
lesser degree. Using eye tracking we were able to examine the allocation of attention 
prior to response, to characterize specifically how people were distracted on these trials. 
We saw that in the older adults, updates led to profound changes in attentional allocation, 
where the eyes showed considerable distractibility from irrelevant information in both the 
early and late portions of the trial, and persisting for several trials. Younger adults, on the 
other hand, saw much more transient distractibility that was much more quickly resolved. 
In general, the patterns were consistent with the notion that older adults were more 
frequently in the updating state, and specifically that the forced updates led to them being 
stuck in that state, while younger adults were more quick to bounce back. In Chapter III, 
we turned to the more challenging question regarding updating that occurs more 
naturally, and not necessarily enforced by the task.  By focusing on fixations towards 
irrelevant cues as an index of updating, we found that updates did occur in response to 
certain task factors (e.g., conflict, errors), but also as a result of the more global task 
context (mixed versus single-task blocks), but also independently of those factors 
(passive carry-over from one trial to the next). Consistent with other work, we found that 
older adults were particularly sensitive to the global context (Spieler, Mayr, & Lagrone, 
2006). We also found they showed a stronger tendency towards passive carry-over, which 
is consistent with the notion that they stay stuck in the updating state over longer epochs 
compared to younger adults. The younger adults, by contrast, seemed to be more swayed 
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by the local task factors, suggesting they were entering this state more in response to the 
task demands. Lastly, in Chapter IV we used neuroimaging (EEG) to lay the groundwork 
for more directly addressing these issues, by providing a means of measuring the trial-by-
trial and moment-by-moment processing of the task environment. In both the decoding 
analyses, we found that we were able to extract distinct elements of the task at different 
points in time, and in the prediction analyses we showed that this information was 
behaviorally-relevant. Moving forward, we can examine how these representations are 
altered in the updating or maintenance states. For instance, in Chapter II, we examine 
how attention towards targets and distractors are changed in the updating state, with the 
assumption that a weaker representation of the task set in the updating state would lead to 
more distractor fixations and/or slower responses. Using the basic setup as in Chapter IV 
but adding the same interruption procedure, we could directly examine how the task-set 
representation is modulated in these post-interruption trials without having to rely on the 
RT or eye movement measures. Similarly, we could contrast how these representations 
change under different global task demands, such as mixed versus single-task blocks. 
Lastly, by adding age-comparative samples, we could have a more sensitive metric by 
which to gauge the age differences. This more sensitive measure could also enable us to 
examine outstanding questions regarding the dynamics of these global states. For 
instance, it is still unclear whether the endogenously-generated updating (as seen in 
Chapter III) may be periodic in nature, occurring at some regular frequency. While the 
age differences seem clear, there is also the possibility that there are stable individual 
differences in the frequency of updating, which could have direct consequences on real-
world outcomes (e.g., academic performance). There is also the outstanding issue 
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whether the increased updating in older adults is a direct consequence of biological 
changes (e.g., decrease in dopamine production, Bäckman, et al., 2006) that drive 
updating automatically, or a strategy on the part of the individual to deal with 
compromised abilities, which may or may not be biologically influenced (e.g., Gazzaley, 
2013; Braver et al., 2001). At the moment, the RT and eye tracking data are just too 
coarse to address these questions, and thus the neuroimaging measures provide some 
hope. Nevertheless, the present project was successful in providing a more thorough 
examination of these executive control dynamics, and in identifying directions for future 
work.  
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APPENDIX 
 
FULL MODEL SUMMARIES FROM CHAPTER II 
 
Table 1. Updating Effect in Experiment 1 by Conflict and Task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
estimate t
Endo, No-Conflict
Age 465 8.46
Experimental 72 1.31
Update 57 3.71
Age x Experimental 122 1.10
Age x Update 81 2.64
Experimental x Update 28 0.92
Age x Experimental x Update 81 1.32
Endo, Conflict
Age 612 8.11
Experimental 176 2.34
Update 85 4.17
Age x Experimental 249 1.65
Age x Update 124 3.03
Experimental x Update 114 2.78
Age x Experimental x Update 184 2.24
Exo, No-Conflict
Age 392 7.55
Experimental 16 0.31
Update 166 7.49
Age x Experimental -13 -0.13
Age x Update 218 4.91
Experimental x Update 42 0.94
Age x Experimental x Update -27 -0.31
Exo, Conflict
Age 430 7.20
Experimental 129 2.16
Update 258 8.25
Age x Experimental 134 1.12
Age x Update 248 3.97
Experimental x Update 235 3.75
Age x Experimental x Update 167 1.34
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Table 2. Linear Effect of Maintenance Trials in Experiment 2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
estimate t
Endo Task
Age 489 7.70
Experimental 95 1.50
Conflict 118 8.54
Linear 2 1.00
Quadratic -1 -0.73
Age x Experimental 135 1.06
Age x Conflict 115 4.16
Experimental x Conflict 57 2.06
Age x Linear -1 -0.25
Age x Quadratic 0 -0.20
Experimental x Linear -2 -0.51
Experimental x Quadratic -1 -0.50
Conflict x Linear 2 0.65
Conflict x Quadratic 0 -0.02
Age x Experimental x Conflict 77 1.39
Age x Experimental x Linear 0 -0.02
Age x Experimental x Quadratic -3 -0.83
Age x Conflict x Linear 2 0.26
Age x Conflict x Quadratic 0 0.13
Experimental x Conflict x Linear -15 -2.34
Experimental x Conflict x Quadratic 4 1.13
Age x Experimental x Conflict x Linear -14 -1.10
Age x Experimental x Conflict x Quadratic 3 0.45
Exo Task
Age 296 7.98
Experimental 1 0.03
Conflict 14 1.83
Linear -8 -4.32
Quadratic 2 2.53
Age x Experimental 25 0.33
Age x Conflict 22 1.43
Experimental x Conflict 1 0.05
Age x Linear -11 -3.11
Age x Quadratic 3 1.85
Experimental x Linear -12 -3.45
Experimental x Quadratic 3 2.34
Conflict x Linear -7 -2.69
Conflict x Quadratic 2 1.48
Age x Experimental x Conflict 44 1.41
Age x Experimental x Linear -12 -1.71
Age x Experimental x Quadratic 2 0.87
Age x Conflict x Linear -8 -1.55
Age x Conflict x Quadratic 1 0.49
Experimental x Conflict x Linear -9 -1.65
Experimental x Conflict x Quadratic 5 1.82
Age x Experimental x Conflict x Linear 14 1.32
Age x Experimental x Conflict x Quadratic -1 -0.16
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Table 3. Comparison with No-Interruption Controls in Experiment 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Updating Effect in Experiment 2 by Conflict  
 
 
Table 5. N -Inter uption Controls - Experiment 1
estimate t
Both Tasks
Experimental 93 1.54
Task 445 15.98
Conflict 116 10.70
Experimental x Task 163 2.94
Experimental x Conflict 47 2.16
Task x Conflict 134 8.68
Experimental x Task x Conflict 102 3.32
Endo Task
Experimental 175 2.18
Conflict 184 12.56
Experimental x Conflict 97 3.33
Exo Task
Experimental 13 0.26
Conflict 49 3.95
Experimental x Conflict -2 -0.06
Table 7. Upating Effect within Conflict - Experiment 2
estimate t
No-Conflict
Age 262 5.46
Task 237 12.54
Update 156 8.13
Age x Task 82 2.16
Age x Update 138 3.61
Task x Update -62 -3.96
Age x Task x Update 33 1.05
Conflict
Age 332 5.65
Task 350 11.88
Update 267 10.65
Age x Task 173 2.94
Age x Update 177 3.54
Task x Update -130 -6.08
Age x Task x Update 7 0.16
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Table 5. Linear Effect of Maintenance Trials in Experiment 2 
 
 
 
 
estimate t
Both Tasks
Age 219 5.26
Task 336 39.36
Conflict 99 8.48
Linear -4 -1.97
Quadratic 2 2.02
Age x Task 129 7.54
Age x Conflict 62 2.67
Task x Conflict 140 8.21
Age x Linear -7 -1.97
Age x Quadratic 2 1.32
Task x Linear 6 2.51
Task x Quadratic 0 0.36
Conflict x Linear -6 -2.65
Conflict x Quadratic 1 0.91
Age x Task x Conflict 70 2.04
Age x Task x Linear -4 -0.85
Age x Task x Quadratic -3 -1.03
Age x Conflict x Linear -5 -1.15
Age x Conflict x Quadratic -1 -0.31
Task x Conflict x Linear 1 0.25
Task x Conflict x Quadratic 2 0.87
Age x Task x Conflict x Linear 7 0.80
Age x Task x Conflict x Quadratic 5 0.83
Endo Task
Old 270 5.27
Conflict 159 7.97
Linear -18 -4.72
Quadratic 9 6.55
Old x Conflict 90 2.25
Age x Linear -22 -2.90
Age x Quadratic 6 2.33
Conflict x Linear -7 -2.22
Conflict x Quadratic 4 2.38
Age x Conflict x Linear -1 -0.08
Age x Conflict x Quadratic 2 0.73
Exo Task
Old 145 3.91
Conflict 19 1.53
Linear -33 -9.36
Quadratic 12 8.57
Old x Conflict 29 1.20
Age x Linear -19 -2.74
Age x Quadratic 8 2.76
Conflict x Linear -20 -7.67
Conflict x Quadratic 5 4.25
Age x Conflict x Linear -6 -1.23
Age x Conflict x Quadratic -4 -1.43
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